Descartes on Unknown Faculties: An Essential Inconsistency

Descartes on Unknown Faculaes: An Essential Inconsistency DAVID FATE NORTON IN THE MEDITATION8 DESCARTESSETS aS his first task the systematic review of his beliefs or opinions with the intent to reject all which fail to meet his demanding all-or-nothing standard: "mais, d'autant que la raison me persuade des-ja que ie ne pas moins soigneusement m'empescher de donner creance aux choses qui ne sont pas entierement certaines & indubitables, qu'i~ celles qui nous paroissent manifestement estre fausses, le moindre sujet de douter que i'y trouueray, suffira pour me les faire toutes rejetter."' In the course of this review he not only casts doubt on his opinions by marshalling against them well-known skeptical objections (e.g., the relativity of our "knowledge" or the inconsistencies of the senses), but also devises a dramatic new skeptical weapon, the malin genie, which enables him to place mathematics and reason itself under suspicion. Once he has restated and strengthened the skeptical arguments, Descartes then goes on to show that even at their best these arguments are inadequate, and thus by the end of Meditation II he is well on his way toward his positive philosophy. I am concerned in this paper, however, with another of Descartes' additions to the arsenal of skepticism: the suggestion (made in Meditation III) that Descartes the thinking substance may be possessed of an unknown faculty with the power to produce any or all the ideas he has. This hypothesis, though quite as dramatic and important as that of the evil genius, has received very little attention, a somewhat surprising fact since its inclusion appears to have far reaching and disastrous consequences in the same meditation: Descartes manages to put down the possibility he has raised only by contradicting himself a few pages later. At least it appears to me that there is such a flaw in the argument of Meditation III, that two claims made in it are inconsistent, and that though Descartes does in Meditation VI attempt to resolve the inconsistency, he is unsuccessful in his attempt. It also appears that Descartes must make both of these inconsistent claims in order to generate the conclusions at which he arrives, and that it is impossible to duplicate his conclusions if either one of his inconsistent claims is held to the exclusion of the other. I wish to thank those who have read and commented on earlier versions of this paper, particularly Professors Henri Gouhier, Richard H. Popkin, and Gregor Sebba. Needless to say, their co-operation in no way commits them to my views. 1(Euvres de Descartes, eds. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, 11 vols. (Paris : L~opold Cerf, 1904),IX, 14; hereafter cited as (Euvres. See also The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, 2 vols. (New York: Dover Publications, 1955),I, 145; hereafter cited as Works. [245] 246 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY I In Meditation III Descartes turns to consider those ideas "qui me semblent venir de quelques objets qui sont hors de moy. ''~ Noting that he has not yet been able to determine the sources of these ideas, he goes on to ask two questions about them: Do they conform to the objects causing them, and (notwithstanding the fact that they occur independently of the will, that is, adventitiously in all apparent respects) are they actually caused by external objects? In answer to this second question he asserts: Et pour l'autre raison, qui est que ces idles doivent venir d'ailleurs, puisqu'elles ne d~pendent pas de ma volont6, ie ne la trouue non plus conuaincante. Car tout de mesme que ces [other natural] inclinations, dent ie parlois tout maintenant, se drouuent en moy, nonobstant qu'elles ne s'aceordent pas tousiours avee ma volont~, ainsi peut-estre qu'il y a en moy quelqueSacult~ ou puissance propre d produire ces idles sans l'ayde d'aucunes choses exterieures, bien qu'dle n~ me soit pas encore connu$; comme en effet il m'a tousiours sembl6 iusques icy que, lorsque ie dors, elles se forment ainsi en moy sans l'ayde des objets qu'elles representent, s Later in the same meditation...