- Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Religion by Julian Young
Nietzsche did not write “books” in the classic sense; he wrote what Roland Barthes called “texts,” i.e. aphoristic writings which are, in Barthes’s words, “irreducibly plural.” As such, Nietzsche’s writings become something of a hermeneutical Rorschach test: Nietzsche interpretation is as much about the hermeneutical subject as it is about the object of interpretation. Put another way: the kinds of reading practices one brings to the Nietzschean text will, a priori, determine the outcome of that reading.
This is very much the case with the recent offering by Julian Young. In what he takes to be a significant re-reading of Nietzsche and a serious intervention into Nietzsche criticism, especially what he constantly refers to as the Anglophone interpretation of Nietzsche, Young argues two things. First, contra (what Young again takes to be) conventional wisdom, Nietzsche was not an atheist but was, rather, a religious reformer. Second, Nietzsche was not, again, as Young assumes the scholarly consensus holds, a radical individualist. Rather, Nietzsche is, on Young’s view, a communitarian and must be seen in the German Volk tradition. As Young argues, although it seems obvious that Nietzsche was “an ‘atheist,’ Murphy holds that he never was. Though atheistic with respect to the Christian God, Nietzsche, Murphy holds ought to be regarded as a religious reformer rather than an enemy of religion. Second, while most readings take Nietzsche to be an ‘individualistic’ philosopher Murphy takes his concern to lie, first and foremost, with community” (2, all italics Young’s).
While both of these, especially the former, are provocative theses, it is important to note to what contrary thesis Young takes himself to be responding. Although he does not say much about it, what he actually names as the [End Page 467] “Anglophone interpretation” to which he is responding is Walter Kaufmann’s work, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (1950, 1st ed.), which Young describes as “enormously influential” (2). He also names Alexander Nehamas, whose work, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (1985), he describes as a continuation of the Kaufmannian individualistic reading of Nietzsche. While he only cites Kaufmann a handful of times throughout the work, it is clear that, in many ways, the development of his thesis is largely formed in response to Kaufmann’s work. Nehamas is cited only once at the very beginning of the work, and Young seems to be generally dismissive of any kind of “literary” reading of Nietzsche. Nowhere are the contemporary French critics such as Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, Blondel, Sarah Kofman, et al, so well known, even notorious, for their re-readings of Nietzsche cited, nor do their works appear in the rather short bibliography.
Young also argues for a close, even intimate, relation between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. In a footnote, Young makes the claim that Nietzsche continued to be influenced by Schopenhauer well into his later years: “In contrast to his later abuse of Wagner, however, throughout his life Nietzsche continues to treat Schopenhauer with great respect and, Murphy thinks, affection, treats him as a—as the—worthy opponent. Still in the 1886 Preface to volume II of Human, he honors him as ‘my first and only educator’” (58). Young’s overall point, an extension of his basic methodology, is to read Nietzsche’s thought in light of his historical context and “influences,” i.e. Schopenhauer “caused” Nietzsche to think certain thoughts. One could argue that the Wagner-Schopenhauer relationship was, in fact, the reverse: Nietzsche was saddened by his rift with Wagner while he came to despise the metaphysics of “pity” (Mittleid) and nihilism of Schopenhauer.
Young treats Nietzsche’s relationship to the German Volk tradition in a similar manner. One of his major claims in this work is that the reason Nietzsche can be seen as a religious reformer rather than an atheist is, again, due to the fact that he celebrated the idea of the Volk and saw religion, a la Durkheim, as a positive force promoting social unity. So the Volk notion and the anti-atheism reading go hand in hand...