Political Islam, Iran, and the Enlightenment: Philosophies of Hope and Despair by Ali Mirsepassi (review)

Political Islam, Iran, and the Enlightenment is founded on the argument that political Islam – which mobilized the Iranian population against the Shah’s regime and led to the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 – was heavily under the influence of certain radical Western counter-Enlightenment philosophies. These ‘non-Islamic ideas’ had a powerful impact on the shaping of the principal ideological components of the Islamic critique of modernity and the West and, ultimately, gave rise to ‘narratives of despair’ as opposed to ‘narratives of hope’. The latter refers to a more sociological approach or vision of social change with particular emphasis on everyday life and pragmatic ethics, while the former – as the dominant feature of the revolutionary ideology – is characterized by a broad philosophical critique of modernity and hostility to liberal and democratic institutions. These narratives which envisage the two sides of Western modernity have had their own distinguished representatives in contemporary Western philosophical thought: John Dewey, the American philosopher, who represents the hope narrative; and Martin Heidegger, the German philosopher, who represents the despair narrative.

Mirsepassi locates the origins of the ‘discourse of despair’ in Iran in a handful of influential Iranian intellectuals – namely, Fardid, Shari‘ati, Al-i Ahmad, and Shayigan – whom he criticizes for their fascination with abstract metaphysical notions of authenticity, their harsh elitist language, and their nostalgia for the old, traditional society and culture; he also feels they were indifferent to the real needs of the Iranian common man. Drawing on Tayeb Salih’s novel, Season of Migration to the North, to underline the complexities as well as the tragic consequences of the ‘return’ discourse which leads to fragmentation and despair, Mirsepassi explores the roots of this nostalgia in the anxiety and insecurity caused by the decentring and uprooting experiences of modernity which pave the way for the emergence of nostalgic desires such as ‘return’, ‘nativism’, and ‘spiritual home’. He then explains that these individuals were responsible for popularising the philosophy of Martin Heidegger in Iran, a philosophy which – according to Mirsepassi – played a key role in the development of the Iranian-Islamic revolutionary discourse, which provided the ideological basis for the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and thereafter. Unfortunately, most of the space actually dedicated to these intellectuals and Heidegger is taken up with an explanation of Heideggerian jargon rather than evidence supporting the main assertion.

The main Islamic intellectual debates in post-revolutionary Iran, especially those of ‘historicism’ and ‘positivism’, are also discussed from this angle. Historicism is treated in this manner because it is marked by the Heideggerian discourse of authenticity; while positivism is characterized by an Islamic discourse of liberal democracy, Mirsepassi maintains that, because of its insistence on a radical transformation of the existing understanding of Shi‘a theology, it is far more consistent with the Heideggerian philosophical tradition. Of most concern with regards to the treatment of these discourses in the book is, despite their centrality in the post-revolutionary era, they are neither well-described nor well-documented.

In contrast to the ‘discourse of despair’, Mirsepassi explores an alternative based on Deweyan pragmatic philosophy since John Dewey is held to have avoided the pitfalls of both liberal scientific secularism and cultural or religious essentialism. Mirsepassi suggests that Deweyan philosophy – as manifested in the British Enlightenment model – presents a satisfactory alternative to the French Revolution, which inspired Ataturk and, to a lesser extent, the Shah of Iran. Following Deweyan pragmatic philosophy, modernity may be envisaged as open-ended, not reduced to a fixed single path or single model of socio-political transformation. Thus, the preference is for the British Enlightenment model, which is based on an inclusive ‘moral sense’, in contrast to the more restricted and elitist French Enlightenment discourse of reason.

Mirsepassi argues that the (British) Deweyan pragmatic philosophy could lead to democracy and a peaceful transition to modernity as it happened in India – where...