In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Reviewed by:
  • The Road to Tahrir Square: Egypt and the United States from the Rise of Nasser to the Fall of Mubarak
  • Jeffrey C. Burke
The Road to Tahrir Square: Egypt and the United States from the Rise of Nasser to the Fall of Mubarak by Lloyd C. Gardner, 2011. London: Saqi, x + 230 pp., £12.99. ISBN: 978-0863-56875-6 (pbk). [AC]

Protesters filled Cairo's Tahrir Square on 25 January 2011 to demand that Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak resign from power. Mubarak's departure raises questions about how the Egyptian Revolution will alter the balance of power in the Middle East, along with ramifications for on-going US policy in the Arab world. Gardner's work is a timely and thought-provoking analysis of 'how the United States has sought to influence Egypt through economic aid, massive military assistance, and CIA manipulations...' (back cover).

Spanning the decades from Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1945 meeting with King Farouk to the recent demise of Mubarak's regime, the work analyzes the historic, economic, diplomatic and military framework of American policy in Egypt and the Middle East. The author taps available records, including the WikiLeaks archive, to examine significant aspects of the two countries' relationship, such as the United States' $50 billion investment in the Egyptian military after Mubarak came to power in 1981 (viii). Gardner asks, 'Would Mubarak have felt able to pursue his repressive policies had he not enjoyed full American backing across nearly three decades?' (ix).

The history of Egyptian-US relations sheds light on why the nascent Egyptian government has veered from Mubarak's status quo of appeasing Washington and instead has:

signaled its intention to reestablish diplomatic relations with Iran, to end cooperation with Israel in blocking the border with Gaza, and has already brokered an agreement between rival Palestinian factions, one of whom, Hamas, is regarded as a terrorist organization by Israel and the United States.

(ix)

In Chapter 1, the author provides an historical backdrop pertaining to US government officials searching for a sustainable policy with [End Page 481] Egypt. As World War II drew to a close, the goal of the Roosevelt administration was 'to help the British' with Egyptian policy matters (3) and strengthen Egyptian-US economic ties. Franklin D. Roosevelt's idea was to partition landed estates in Egypt to be owned by the fillahin (agricultural workers) (1).

Roosevelt had warned the king that he must move to relieve the conditions of the poor and landless fellaheen. While Egypt's national pride was at stake in the Palestine and Suez questions, the underlying economic problem proved in the end to be the most corrosive challenge to leaders in Cairo.

(9)

Roosevelt sought to convince the king that the US could offer economic and military aid to Egypt in an endeavour to increase trade between the two countries after World War II. American policymakers were aware that '[t]rade with Egypt had in fact increased eightfold during the war' (2). Roosevelt 'hoped American purchases of long-staple cotton, a vital Egyptian export, would increase, along with trade in other commodities. Tourist travel to Egypt, he felt sure, was certain to become greater after the war' (2).

After the war, American policymakers attempted to assure Farouk and other leaders of Middle Eastern countries that the United States 'would not allow the old colonial powers, Great Britain and France, to reclaim the privileged position they held before the war, and was, in fact, ready to offer economic, and, if carefully managed, military aid to insure the independence and internal security of these countries' (3).

Although Gardner details Farouk's meeting with Roosevelt on the USS Quincy in 1945, additional background information about the king, drawn from a biography such as William Stadiem's Too Rich: The High Life and Tragic Death of King Farouk, would have better explained his political motivations. 'Farouk liked to think that his championing of resistance to Jewish plans for a state carved out of Palestine and his responsiveness to resentment at British military policy could be combined into a program that would save his monarchy' (7). Whether Farouk anticipated the enormous repercussions of this policy for his country...

pdf

Share