Nietzsche: Virtue Ethics. . . Virtue Politics?

In this article, I propose to reconstruct Friedrich Nietzsche's ethical teachings and read them as a form of virtue ethics.¹ This reading is partly inspired by Kaufmann's generous rendering of Nietzsche's ethics. In his classic study, Kaufmann supposes that Aristotle's philosophy had a great influence on Nietzsche's ethics. He also asserts that Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity cannot be rightly appreciated without noting the Aristotelian ethics that inspired it.² Kaufmann's assertions are grounded in a connection he establishes between the Aristotelian notion of megalopsychia found in Nicomachean Ethics and the figure of the Übermensch. I will approach this connection in a variety of ways in the first section of my essay and will show how we must go beyond Kaufmann. If one chooses to dismiss the connection between Aristotle's and Nietzsche's ethics, as I will do, this does not mean that Nietzsche's ethics cannot be read as an instance of virtue ethics. In the second section, I will articulate how it is possible to interpret the ethical ideas of Nietzsche as forming a type of virtue ethics that focuses on the character development of the agent. I will define virtue ethics and show how Nietzsche can be seen as a virtue ethicist. I will explain how he shares the critical moment found in the revival of virtue ethics mostly articulated in the twentieth century and also how he shares in the constructive program found therein.³ In a third section, I will address the problem that awaits those who want to read Nietzsche generously, as I do, as a virtue ethicist. This problem arises with respect to his aristocratic politics found in certain texts. It will then become clear that an articulation of his ethical ideas with respect to his political ideas is problematic. I will attempt to solve this problem, though my proposed solution will emphasize a certain part of the corpus while necessarily overlooking another.

Nietzsche and Aristotle

In an article titled "Aristotle and Nietzsche: 'Megalopsychia' and 'Uebermensch,'" Bernd Magnus argues that the Aristotelian reading of Nietzsche, initiated by Walter Kaufmann, must be dismissed. In the classic Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, Kaufmann suggests that Aristotle's conception made a tremendous impression on Nietzsche, so much so that his opposition to Christianity can only be understood in those terms. According to Kaufmann, Nietzsche's debt to Aristotle's ethics is considerable. His assertions stem from a connection he establishes between Aristotle's conception of pride in book 4 of the Nicomachean Ethics, also referred to as "greatness of soul," and the Übermensch. Magnus argues that Kaufmann's reading of the proud man and the Übermensch is a superficial reading of both. Magnus continues: "Aristotle's ethics—even his conception of pride—has very little to do either with Nietzsche's moral philosophy, or with his conception of Uebermenschen."⁴ He is inspired by aphorism 198 of Beyond Good and Evil in which Nietzsche rejects Aristotelian ethics as an instance of "[m]orality as timidity."

Magnus's main point has to do with the Aristotelian concepts of eudaimonia and phronesis. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle talks about the one good that is sought by human beings by nature: eudaimonia, that is, happiness. Happiness is the only overarching good that we seek. The good for the human is the fulfillment of one's distinctive function, which, according to Aristotle, is the activity of reason. The concept of eudaimonia specifies that "one lives a flourishing life if one is engaged in the successful development and active exercise of one's nature, characteristically human capacities across time."⁵ For Aristotle, the human capacity in question is rationality in thought and action. Therefore, the individual lives a flourishing life if one lives a rational life, that is, a life guided by phronesis, practical wisdom. The phronemos is the person who possesses this practical wisdom that allows him to determine virtue, which is understood as the mean between a vice by excess and a vice by default. He determines virtue in view of the good, happiness, which is ultimately a life of intellectual activity...