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  • Greek Naval Strategy and Policy 1910–1919
  • Richard C. Hall
Zisis Fotakis . Greek Naval Strategy and Policy 1910–1919. New York: Routledge, 2005. Pp. xv + 223. 5 Maps, 2 tables. $160.00.

The roles of smaller European countries in the Great Power machinations at the beginning of the twentieth century are often overlooked by historians. Their attempts to pursue their own agendas amidst Great Power conflict remain obscure. Zisis Fotakis, a lecturer at the Hellenic Naval War College and the University of Piraeus, has elucidated the efforts of the Greek Navy to navigate among the Great Power fleets during the decade 1910–1919 in his monograph, Greek Naval Strategy and Policy 1910–1919. The Greek agenda included hostility to the Ottoman Empire, the main naval rival in the northeastern Mediterranean, and a complex connection with the neighboring states in southeastern Europe, including Bulgaria, Serbia, and, after 1913, Albania. All these states were potential allies against the Ottomans and potential rivals for the Ottoman legacy in southeastern Europe.

The great strength of this monograph is the author's use of Greek archival sources and secondary sources as well as archival material from Austria, Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. Greek primary and secondary sources bring to readers of western languages much new and interesting material, such as the archives of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Greek Army and the log book of the Greek cruiser Averoff, the most formidable vessel in the Greek Navy during the early part of the period covered.

Fotakis makes the divided nature of Greek politics particularly evident in this monograph. While Greeks were united in their desire to realize nationalist goals in Epirus, Macedonia, and the Aegean at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, they differed on the question of which Great Power bloc offered the best means to achieve these goals. In this division, the Greeks were similar to their Bulgarian and Romanian neighbors. Among the southeastern European nations, only Serbia was firmly in the camp of the Triple Entente by 1914. Crown Prince Constantine's marriage to Kaiser Wilhelm's sister, Princess Sophie, further complicated the situation. When in 1913 he became king upon the assassination [End Page 239] of his father, Constantine personally inclined towards Germany. On the other hand, a British delegation advised the Greek Navy until the First World War, and British influence remained strong in Greek naval circles afterwards.

The equivocal role played by the Greek Navy in the Goeben affair of August 1914 was illustrative of this dichotomy in Greek policy. Professor Fotakis adds a new dimension to the understanding of this incident. He notes that while the Greek Navy had little reason to welcome the augmentation of the Ottoman fleet by the Goeben and the Breslau, some in the Greek Navy may have perceived these enhancements as a basis for securing powerful new warships from the British for the Greek fleet. The Greeks, therefore, did not interfere with the dash of the Goeben to the Straits, and may even have facilitated it.

The greatest triumph of the Greek Navy during this period covered in the book was its performance against a superior Ottoman fleet during the First Balkan War. Because of geography, the Greeks had the only significant naval force among the Balkan states. This was a significant factor in the formation of the Balkan alliance of 1912 among Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia. The Bulgarians, the main instigators of an effort among the Balkan states to drive the Ottoman Empire out of Europe and, in doing so, realize their nationalist objectives, had little confidence in the Greek army given that its performance in the Greco-Turkish War of 1897 had been abysmal. Thus, the Greeks were included in the Balkan alliance because of their navy. During the First Balkan War, the Greek Navy prevented the Ottomans from drawing upon their troops in Anatolia and Syria to reinforce their European possessions. It also seized control of those Aegean islands still remaining under Ottoman control in 1912 as it bottled up the Ottoman fleet in the Dardanelles.

The low point of the Greek Navy in the period covered in the book was its...

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