Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War: Cyprus, a Firsthand Account of Crisis Management, 1965–1968 (review)

Reviews 157 KazantzakL·: Politics of the Spirit is the first part of a projected two-volume study. It covers Kazantzákis's development through the completion and publication of the Odyssey in 1938. The subsequent volume is to concentrate on the second phase of Kazantzákis's creative life and the culminating achievement of the fictional works that made him famous throughout the world. This reviewer is eagerly anticipating the publication of the second part of this farreaching critical project that, judging from the present volume, will make a substantial contribution to Kazantzákis scholarship. Thanasis Maskaleris San Francùco State University Parker T. Hart, Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War: Cyprus, a Firsthand Account of CrisL· Management, 1965-1968. Durham: Duke University Press. 1990. Pp. xxix + 222. $37.50. This latest addition to the English bibliography on Cyprus was written by Parker T. Hart, who served as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey from 1965 to 1968. In that capacity he was involved in Cyrus Vance's mission, which defused the 1967 crisis over Cyprus. The book is therefore presented as an insider's view of crisis management and is complemented by a lengthy documentary appendix. Most of the documents, however, have been published earlier, with the exception of some heavily sanitized excerpts from the archives of the National Security Council. The November 1967 crisis developed out of clashes between Greek and Turkish Cypriots for the control of a key stretch of a major highway in Cyprus, leading to Turkey's subsequent threat to intervene militarily on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots. The author's admiration for Vance's negotiating skills is evident throughout the book. Vance is described as "a man of great strength, humane, direct, persistent, resourceful, tireless, and, only when necessary, very tough" (101). Hart concludes that Vance's successful mediation defused a serious crisis, salvaged NATO's integrity, and opened the way for the intercommunal talks that were held in Cyprus from 1968 to 1974 in search of a revised constitution for the island republic. The author admits that alternatives to warfare in explosive situations beyond the immediate control of external parties cannot be modeled in advance . In hindsight, however, he offers a number of useful conclusions derived from the management of this crisis, including (a) the realization that an escalating crisis moves faster than the decision-making mechanisms in the capitals of countries involved in a dispute, thus undermining diplomatic initiatives aimed at conciliation; (b) the importance of accurate assessment of situations and the need for rapid communication; (c) the full authority granted to Cyrus Vance, who enjoyed non-interference from Washington and strong 158 Reviews back-up during his crisis-management actions; (d) the personality of the mediator and of key leaders in countries involved in the dispute, in this case the leaders opting to avoid war and refusing to be stampeded by public or private pressures; (e) the avoidance of either humiliation or victory in the outcome; and (f ) the near absence of public scrutiny and publicity. The book is valuable for both its admissions and its omissions. First, the admissions. Most revealing is Hart's conclusion that it is "grotesque that Cyprus should have twice threatened free world security. It is today a question of federating two working democracies with fifteen years of separate experience" (141). This statement displays a superpower's contempt toward a small state and its problems, and the pro-Turkish bias of American policy that contributed both to the Cyprus tragedy of 1974 and to the non-resolution of the dispute since then. Hart, like other American and some Greek diplomats, disliked President Makarios of Cyprus because, until 1974, he was able to defend his country's interests against the secret diplomacy of Greece, Turkey, and the United States. The author describes how the U.S. attempted to circumvent Makarios in the resolution of this crisis. An admirer of the ex-king of Greece, the author reveals that Constantine played a significant role in the management of the 1967 crisis. The ex-king was instrumental in gaining the junta's acceptance of Vance's and Turkey's demands, and in obtaining General Grivas's recall from...