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>J The German Withdrawal from Greece in 1944 and British Naval "Inactivity Lars Baerentzen Introduction During the spring of 1944, when it became clear that the German occupation of south-east Europe would soon come to an end, the old struggle between Great Britain and Russia for influence in the Balkans again came to the surface. British fears that the German withdrawal would be followed by Soviet control over the whole of the Balkans were well-founded. Any major Anglo-American operation in this area had been ruled out, and the proximity of the Red Army was matched by the predominance of Communist influence among the guerrillas in both Yugoslavia and Greece. There were also signs of Russian determination to control events in Bulgaria and Rumania. In April and May 1944 the British Government decided that it would make every effort to retain British influence at least in Greece. The deal between Britain and Russia, which resulted after months of negotiations, is today well-known as the "Percentages Agreement." It gave Britain the predominant influence in Greece in return for a British acceptance of Russian dominance in the rest of the Balkans. This, however, was never a formal agreement, and in spite of Russian assurances that no Russian forces would be sent into Greece, the British Government continued to worry about Russian intentions, especially before the famous meeting between Churchill and Stalin in Moscow on 9 October, when the "Percentages" were actually jotted down (Barker, 1976). This meeting took place a full six weeks after the German withdrawal from Greece had begun and a mere three days before the Germans left Athens. By this time, the elaborate British plans to ensure the return to Greece of a non-Communist Government were already being executed. 237 238 Lars Baerentzen It has been claimed, most authoritatively by Albert Speer in his memoirs from 1969, that the British, in their anxiety to forestall the Russians in Greece, made a secret deal with the Germans by which the Germans were allowed to withdraw their troops virtually unmolested from the Greek islands. Speer wrote that "in some cases, the German vessels passed within visual range of British naval units. As a quid pro quo, the German side had agreed to use these troops to hold Salonika against the Russians until the city could be taken over by British forces."1 This story is sometimes accepted at face value especially by historians eager to demonstrate the cynicism of British policy in Greece (Richter 1973: 485). Others have dismissed it as propaganda originating in a German attempt to drive a wedge between the Allies.1A It has been pointed out that "lenient treatment" of the German transports would have required specific orders to the British forces, and that no trace of such orders has ever been found (Woodhouse 1982a: 225-236). It is a fact, however, that for a brief period the German withdrawal was much more undisturbed than the Germans had dared to hope. It is also a fact that there were secret contacts between British and German agents in Greece in the period just before and during the German withdrawal. Reliable evidence shows that both sides for a time toyed with the idea of making some sort of deal, but it also shows that the two sides had very different objects in view: the Germans were hoping to extricate their forces more easily from Greece, and the British were interested in making them stay and surrender when the British arrived. It is not at all clear whether—or how— these secret contacts had anything to do with naval operations in the Aegean. In this paper I shall present an analysis of events in Greece during the German withdrawal and in particular of naval operations in the Aegean from mid-August to mid-September 1944. I shall argue that there is no evidence for deliberate lenient treatment of the Germans by the British forces at any time, and that some German officers ' possibly sincere belief in the existence of a secret agreement with the British was mistaken. But it is equally clear that the British military actions in Greece during this period were determined primarily by...

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