In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

  • Letters to the Editor
  • Stephen Sussna

We are always pleased to have letters to the editor because this shows that people are reading our Journal seriously. However, due to space limitations, we ask that letters be kept under 500 words.

To the Editor:

A. Proper Context

In his review of my book Defeat and Triumph, JMH Vol. 73, no. 2, Professor Stephen Bourque notes that the first half of the book's narrative is devoted to recounting a wide range of topics related to the invasion of southern France in August 1944, known as Operation Dragoon. Bourque then contradicts this statement and ignores the fact that the 717 page book is replete with material that covers three related Mediterranean amphibious invasions, other pertinent events and narratives concerning military and civilian participants. His claim that I have not put Operation Dragoon in the context that it deserves is baseless.

B. Perspective

Bourque also contends that I did not tell the story of the landing from the perspective of the sailors who brought the soldiers ashore. He ignored Admiral Spencer S. Lewis "Action Report–Assault on the beaches of southern France" (see pages 306-308, 483, 487, 490, 491) which discredits Mr. Bourque's complaint as do reports from various American sailors (see pages 390-411, 414, 416, 417, 418, 563 and 637-639).

He writes that Dragoon was a side-show. Many authorities disagree. General George C. Marshall observed that it greatly aided the continued deterioration of the German Army's position in France and "The very threat of such a landing had held substantial German forces of the First and Nineteenth Armies immobilized in the south of France, preventing their deployment against our forces in Normandy. A naval force, comparable in size to the one which participated in the American landings in Normandy, had been assembled. An air offensive, conducted chiefly by the Allied Strategic Air Forces, prepared the way for the invasion by sustained attacks on vital enemy communications and installation in southern France" (see pp. 503-4).

Mr. Bourque overlooked the comparisons of the Normandy and Dragoon invasions. Historian Alan F. Wilt found that the two invasions were exceedingly important to the Allied war effort (p. 434). [End Page 1060]

Operation Dragoon was described in a 1984 U.S. Army Command and General Staff College study as highly controversial and drawing "more fire from participants and observers than perhaps any World War II decision" (see p. 157, Defeat and Triumph).

C. Book Editing

Bourque complains that it is (1) an awkward mixture of individual accounts and military reports that leave the reader somewhat confused, (2) is disjointed, and (3) that it quotes large sections of reports.

Professional editorial decisions were made concerning placement and extent of narrative, statistics, and illustrations. There is very little about me in the text because of my minor role in the Dragoon invasion. The book's Note section does have collateral anecdotal information about me. In the Appendix section, the reader finds extensive statistical material, logs of ships, and a fascinating telegram from Ambassador Robert D. Murphy to Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Decisions concerning how much of a document to use were also based on standard editorial criteria.

D. Conclusion

Professor Bourque mentions Jeffrey Clarke and Robert Ross Smith's magnificent 1992 Army history: Riviera to the Rhine. Not only have seventeen years passed, but much new material related to Dragoon has been uncovered and is now available.

Dr. Bourque stands by his review. [End Page 1061]

Stephen Sussna
Emeritus, Baruch College, City University of New York
New York, New York
...

pdf

Share