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  • Normandy: The Landings to the Liberation of Paris
  • John A. English
Normandy: The Landings to the Liberation of Paris. By Olivier Wieviorka. Translated by M.B. DeBevoise.. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-674-02838-8. Maps. Charts. Notes. Archival sources. Select bibliography. Index. Pp. xiv, 446. $29.95.

This work was first published in January 2007 as Histoire du débarquement en Normandie: Des origines à la libération de Paris, 1941-1944 (Paris, Editions du Seuil) and provides a French perspective on the planning and execution of the Normandy campaign to the liberation of Paris. Wieviorka offers a sweeping account, covering with broad brush strokes the development of Allied relationships, Anglo-American economic and military mobilization, D-Day preparations and logistical arrangements, combat training, bombing and deception strategies, and German expectations, in his first six chapters. He then recounts the invasion and subsequent operations in another five chapters, including one entitled "Psychoneuroses." His last two chapters, arguably the most original and informative in the entire book, describe Charles de Gaulle's struggle for legitimacy and Allied recognition, the role of the French Resistance, and France's resurrection from the humiliation of defeat.

Not everyone will agree with all of the detail that Wieviorka impressively weaves together. In a wide-ranging introduction he takes issue with Eisenhower's Crusade in Europe and, targeting Stephen Ambrose, "the curiously naïve view that the Allies fought only for principles." He further asserts that owing to "Roosevelt's credulous attachment to a peculiarly American set of ideals," the Normandy invasion led to a diplomatic Munich. In a more focused thesis statement, he alleges that soldiers and historians alike, "eager to magnify the importance of [D-Day]…have often preferred its heroic charms to the harsh realities of the day, in relegating to the margins of silence everything that contradicts the legend." The sheer violence of the campaign that followed, he argues, has been deliberately downplayed by historians seeking to glorify the exploits of Allied soldiers. In short, "American and British [End Page 1007] authors have propagated a triumphalist image of brave men who unhesitatingly sacrificed their lives to liberate France and crush Nazism." Wieviorka also charges that the specialization of historical writing in the U.S., Canada, and Great Britain has tended to obscure the interconnection of political, diplomatic, and economic aspects with the military dimension.

Wieviorka correctly points out that the success of the cross channel attack was by no means a forgone conclusion, but he seems to believe that most Anglo-American historians do not share this view. In tracing the decision-making chronology of the Grand Alliance, moreover, he may also have missed the true significance of the ABC-1/ABC-22 war plans and why the Americans chose to ally so intimately with the British alone. As for the rationale underpinning the Operation Torch peripheral strategy, he would have benefited greatly from consulting Douglas Porch's excellent The Path to Victory: The Mediterranean Theater in World War II (2004). It is also striking that while he used several Richard Overy sources, he did not avail himself of that scholar's acclaimed Why the Allies Won (1995), which examined war production and technologies in depth. Wieviorka's reliance on Ralph Ingersoll's controversial Top Secret (1946) and, for that matter, F. W. Wintherbotham's sensational The Ultra Secret (1974) is also questionable.

That said, Wieviorka provides a logically organized and highly readable discussion of the logistical and strategic requirements for the Normandy landing within the context of Russian operations and Soviet peace feelers to Germany. His treatment of Allied deception measures is succinct but thorough, though not particularly new. The same can be said of his discussion of the dysfunctional nature of the German high command as compared to the Anglo-American staff structure for directing operations. The emphasis accorded to the limitation of air strike collateral damage to France and her citizenry in the Transportation Plan is additionally warranted and highly informative.

Throughout his work, Wieviorka provides a wealth of statistics on various economic aspects, equipment shortcomings, and troop strengths to challenge "simplistic views about the planning of the invasion." As might be expected...

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