Empire Lost: Britain, The Dominions and The Second World War (review)

What a problem the Empire posed for the United Kingdom after the First World War! This very interesting study looks at the relationship between the metropolitan, imperial center, London, and the outlying Dominions (Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand); despite the title, the book is not about 'empire' in the widest sense, but concentrates on the four 'white' Dominions in the aftermath of the Great War and the period of the Second World War.

There is no question but that London found the Dominions difficult to deal with. Their various experiences in the Great War had shown to each of them that they were not mere appendages of the imperial mother but had views, priorities and goals of their own. For the most part these rested on an understanding that membership of the greatest empire the world had ever seen brought inestimable benefits, but not at the cost of the emergence of distinctive Dominion identities. Gallipoli and the Western Front were enough to demonstrate that the mother country did not necessarily always know what was best, while the Statute of Westminster in 1931 acknowledged the fact, in law, if not in acknowledged practice, that the empire consisted of co-equal dominions.

What did this mean when the test of war came in 1939? This book deals with the Dominions as a whole, but gives particular attention to Australia, for obvious reasons. Canada, South Africa and New Zealand were not exposed to the immediate dangers that Australia faced, mainly because of geography. The Great War had brought home to Australian planners the problems of being part of a greater British force. It proved very difficult for Australian and Canadian commanders to insist on the integrity of their forces, that they were not to be used as 'penny packets' to reinforce the failed attempts of British commanders, but were to fight, by 1918, under their own commanders as corps within the BEF, to contribute to the ultimate victory.

In the Second World War, the new-found confidence and sense of independence (within an imperial context) gave rise to numerous difficulties. In an empire of co-equal partners it was clear on one level that some were more equal than others. It could hardly be disputed that the United Kingdom was the indispensable core of the Empire, but what did that mean in terms of the prosecution of war? The 'Germany first' strategy, perfectly rational and sensible, took on a somewhat different significance when viewed from Australia. Churchill's insistence that the centre had to be protected at all costs was hardly reassuring when viewed against the emerging menace of Japan. The Singapore strategy, the cornerstone of imperial defense in southeast Asia, was already showing signs of strain long before the events of late 1941-early 1942 exposed it for the folly that it was. The collapse of British power in Asia brought to the fore long-standing disagreements within the Dominions over how to prosecute war on a world-wide basis.

Dr Stewart has written a fascinating account of these tribulations, and very much to his credit he has mined archival sources from all of the Dominions. Despite the occasional lapse in detail (the Australian Labour [rather than Labor] Party; Kippel [rather than Keppel] Harbour), he has made an admirable attempt to get away from a London-centric view. Nevertheless, he is too inclined to accept the British perspective without considering that other views were equally valid. For example, John Curtin, the wartime Australian prime minister, was subject to harsh criticism by Churchill for his insistence on withdrawing Australian troops from North Africa in order to counter a perceived Japanese threat, and was consistently viewed by British leaders and officials as 'inexperienced'. What does this mean? Churchill's record, by 1942, could hardly have inspired confidence if experience was to be the measure: the Gallipoli fiasco (of which he was almost the sole...