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  • Bad Strategies: How Major Powers Fail in Counterinsurgency
  • Andrew J. Birtle
Bad Strategies: How Major Powers Fail in Counterinsurgency. By James S. Corum. Minneapolis, Minn.: Zenith Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-7603-3080-7. Maps. Notes. Index. Pp. 304. $28.00.

In his latest book, Dr. James Corum presents a generally lucid analysis of why nations waging counterinsurgencies sometimes fail. He shows how bad policies and errant strategies, dysfunctional organizational arrangements, and flawed decision making processes have led countries to lose wars that they should have won. Four case studies act as the foil for the study—the Algerian Civil War of 1954-1962, the Cyprus Rebellion of 1955-1959, the Vietnam War of 1954-1975, and the war in Iraq from 2003 up to the time of his writing (the fall of 2007). Although he does not present a pat model for success in deference to counterinsurgency's complex nature, Corum identifies twelve issues that a nation waging a counterinsurgency would do well to address if it is to obtain a successful outcome. Among these are the necessity of setting obtainable goals, the wisdom of seeking compromise and political settlements, and the perils posed when an unhealthy relationship exists between civil and military policymakers. The book is highly readable and lends itself to being used as a primer on the subject. As is typical of works of this genre, however, the book cites practically no primary sources, diminishing its value for scholars who will find little new in terms of historical content. The author's reliance on secondary sources also sometimes leads him to follow stereotypes, myths, and interpretations that may not serve him well.

In my opinion, the chapter on the Algerian War is the best, while the section on Cyprus profitably examines a conflict that often escapes examination. Corum's treatment of the current Iraq War is both interesting and depressing, but is handicapped by the fact that his coverage necessarily ends in mid-2007 before the results of the "surge" were in. I also feel the author does not always take into consideration countervailing views. For example, he does not balance his condemnation of the decision to disband the Iraqi Army with a full discussion of either the reasons for this action or the possible negative consequences of keeping personnel associated with past repression in place. Consequently, the reader is not always comfortable that the author is as objective as he should be or has adhered to his pledge to base his judgments exclusively on what was known at the time.

The weakest chapter of the book is the one on Vietnam. The author vastly underestimates the challenges facing Diem in the early 1950s and 1960s. Surprisingly, he makes little effort to examine one of the critical choices of the war, the decision to depose Diem—a decision that, regardless of whether one agrees with it or not, certainly had a disastrous effect. He incorrectly portrays the insurgency as a purely internal affair, reducing the North during the early years of the conflict to that of an innocent bystander. By overlooking the guiding role that North Vietnam played from the very start, the book presents a skewed picture of the conflict. Corum incorrectly states that U.S. military leadership refused to view the conflict as a counterinsurgency. He properly condemns the limited war/gradual escalation strategy but does not adequately probe the factors that led the U.S. to conduct the [End Page 1030]war the way it did. The chapter also does not make sufficient efforts to balance opposing viewpoints. Thus, Corum heaps praise on the Marine Combined Action Platoon (CAP) concept uncritically. He states that the U.S. could have replicated the CAP program throughout Vietnam using only 28,000 men. A 1967 Defense Department study reported that such an undertaking would have required 167,000 combat troops. A more optimistic 1969 RAND report pegged the requirement at 78,000 infantrymen—an unobtainable sum when one considers that in 1969 the U.S. Army only had 54,000 infantrymen in Vietnam. Corum's citation for his troop estimate leads one to a North Vietnamese history of the war that does not mention...

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