La grande strategia di Roma nell'età della prima guerra punica (C.A. 273-C.A.229 A.C.) L'inizio di un paradosso (review)

This latest work by Luigi Loreto is an examination of the context of the First Punic War. This war has received renewed attention in the last decade so that this book enters an active field. Loreto is well-placed to turn his attention to this period as a number of his previous works have focused on aspects of the same period in Mediterranean history. His stated goal is not a history of the war, however. As the title suggests, Loreto is interested in examining the macro-strategic thinking that surrounds the war, not just during the war, but before and after it too. His intended audience includes graduate students and scholars, not only in ancient military history, but also those in and interested in international relations. Regardless of one's field of interest, readers may find this study useful and provocative.

Loreto organized his book into seven parts. In his introduction it emerges that the paradox to which Loreto is referring in the title is what Polybius had noticed as the sudden rise of Rome as an imperial power. The author makes clear his goal and his method. The reader then realizes that the discussion will be an examination of the grand strategies and the international system into which the First Punic War fit. In the first part Loreto sets up what he calls the macro-strategic revolution. Naval power and the maritime sphere consume part two, but these topics come up repeatedly in later segments. The third and longest part of the study is taken up with discussion of spheres of action and mechanisms for the application of grand strategy. Part four is a useful discussion of demography, economy, and finances as related to the overarching issue of grand strategy. This part also has a lengthy set of related appendices. Naval power comes up again in part five, where Loreto focuses on how it contributed to ending the war and the period that follows. The way the grand strategy was conceived and developed at Rome is the topic of the next part. The seventh and final part, titled "The necessity of not winning a war," wraps up the discussion nicely by bringing all the previous threads of discussion together. A highlight of this final part is a segment in which he considers the application of the grand strategies of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Halford Mackinder to Rome and Carthage in the third century. The text closes with another useful set of appendices on various aspects previously treated in the work, followed by a bibliography and index.

Loreto's work has several strengths. He provides a new way of looking at an ancient war, a provocative application of modern concepts of grand strategy and international relations that will undoubtedly stimulate further discussion and research. Loreto is also consistent in his treatment of the Punic Wars as part of the third-century Mediterranean world as a whole, not just a Roman-Carthaginian issue. Additionally, there is a thorough awareness of the historiography of the topic as evidenced in the copious textual footnotes in which Loreto often responds to previous work. The bibliography is thorough, useful, and international in its coverage.

Weaknesses, however, are present and detract from the book's promise. The most serious shortcoming is the complete lack of maps. In numerous places in the text the author describes patterns of settlement, trade routes, campaigns, and other geographical relationships. The lack of maps means that readers must hunt down their own maps and then seek out each site individually and try to piece together the image the author is trying to convey. Regardless of whether this is a cost saving move forced on the author by the publisher, it is a most distracting...