Recollections of the War with Mexico (review)

Gary F. Kurutz conducted the very thorough search for materials that would be expected of a scholar in his position: Curator of Special Collections at the California State Library. This volume is a fine example of the editor's craft and includes some six hundred endnotes. Unlike Kurutz's performance, Major Henshaw's left much to be desired.

The major's problems with those in authority began early in life. After leaving home at the age of sixteen without offering a farewell to his parents, Henshaw soon brought a brief career at a New Orleans mercantile house to an end by refusing to perform duties he found disagreeable. Upon returning to New York, he began a second career in the counting house of an uncle. That job ended with the Panic of 1837. After marrying Amelia Nash Kellogg in 1838, Henshaw soon left her with her parents in Brooklyn so that he could start a career in Illinois. When that failed, he headed back east and, armed with letters of reference, obtained a Lieutenant's commission. Kurutz discusses this and more in a concise biography at the start of the volume.

Once Henshaw formed a hostile opinion of a superior officer, contravening realities would not change his judgment. For example, he deemed General Zachary Taylor's victories at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma "nothing more than skirmishes between both armies and won by a simultaneous and headlong rush upon the enemy" (p. 75). While this characterization neatly dovetails with Henshaw's low opinion of Taylor, such sentiment denies the reality of both battles. Mexican records admitted losses for the two clashes of 772 men out of a combined total of 7,461 engaged, a casualty rate of ten per cent . These were not skirmishes .

Moreover, the Americans' comparatively low losses (170 men lost out of 3,900 engaged for a casualty rate of four per cent) confirmed Taylor's effective use of the new state-of-the-art flying artillery in nullifying the Mexican advantage in numbers. Yet Henshaw gave Taylor no credit and would give none to General Winfield Scott.

A few days after the surrender of the fortress (San Juan de Ulloa) that guarded Veracruz's harbor, Henshaw deemed that bastion of such strength that: "…the man who would surrender it to the combined powers of the world ought to die the death of a traitor" (p. 124). So by implication, he attributed the American conquest of the fortress to the weakness of the Mexican commander who surrendered. Here, Henshaw ignored Scott's inventive use of the indirect approach by first taking Veracruz from the landward side and then cutting off the harbor fort's water supply. But Henshaw previously had likened Scott to a "Pot-House demagogue" (p. 47) and if the Major did not like a General, then victory must be attributed to some factor other than that general's skill.

Henshaw's political judgments proved no sounder. He argued that Mexico's leaders lacked the courage to sign a treaty surrendering so large a portion of the national territory because they feared the consequent outbreak of a revolution. Obviously, they did not lack the courage required to sign such a treaty and they indeed did so in order to direct their remaining resources to rebellions already underway.

Henshaw's contumacious nature led to four courts martial. Yet in spite of his shortcomings, he satisfactorily executed his battle orders, gallantly offered aid to fallen foes, and received a brevet promotion to Major for action taken under very heavy fire at one of the battles (Churubusco) for Mexico City. He remains a conflicted and enigmatic figure. At one point, Kurutz wonders if Henshaw should have been an officer. So do I.