The First World War as a Clash of Cultures (review)

A casual reader might think this a bad book, without a point or with one too narrow. Given the descriptive nature of the introduction and the absence of a conclusion, its aim is not clear; but this book does have one, which is broader and better than might seem to be the case. Following Paul Kennedy's The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914, and to a lesser degree I.F. Clarke's Voices Prophesying War, The First World War as a Clash of Cultures focuses on the images which British and German writers, scholars and intellectuals, purveyed of each other's nation between 1900 and 1918. The result is of primary value to students of literary and cultural history, but of some use to those interested in international perceptions, which includes many diplomatic and strategic historians.

The authors in this collection address topics like the portrayal of Anglo German conflict in the popular fiction of both countries between 1870-1914, D.H. Lawrence's attitudes toward Germans and H.G. Wells's view of Martians, Friedrich Nietzsche as a hate figure in Britain, and the impact of concepts of militarism and evolution on attitudes across the North Sea. These topics and the comparative treatment are worthy, and the authors expert, but the building would gain from architecture. One might ask for evidence of how these matters affected public opinion, or discussion of this genre of commentary as a whole, or of how such writings were organized, through analysis of the role of the press, universities, or the state. The book offers more on British ideas of German individuals and aggression than on the opposite case, through an examination of such things as Teutonic ideas of English imperialism. It would gain from greater analysis of issues which the two countries had in common, such as militarism and imperialism, and how one nation interpreted those phenomena in the other case. The compilation tends to focus on the negative side of attitudes between these peoples, and to ignore the positive one, which was a notable factor before 1914. Images have many faces, none of which can be understood fully apart from the context of the others.

The figures discussed in these essays saw the great war as a clash of civilizations, as do, from a more nuanced position, the authors and editor. Were, and are, they right to do so? These chapters reflect efforts by educated people to understand rivals and neighbours in peace, and then enemies and a war. They offer direct evidence of attitudes but not of their impact. In fact, these ideas had a weak effect on the outbreak of the war. Few diplomatic and strategic historians believe that a First World War must have broken out in 1914, though they are divided ( perhaps equally ) between those who think that something on those lines was inevitable within a few years, and those who do not, especially because another diplomatic renversement was under weigh, as Britain drifted from Russia and toward Germany, though still trying to maintain a stable and peaceful Europe. The sorts of Anglo-German images described in the book did not drive these two countries to war, though a different set of them did: the belief among German decision makers that they could manipulate crisis toward either diplomatic triumph or war, while still keeping Britain neutral, was fundamental to their decisions in July 1914. Popular ideas did shape the outbreak of war, by legitimizing states, interests, and the use of force, but the matters discussed in this volume were minor elements among them. Insofar as popular images shaped the outbreak of war, the Anglo-German relationship was just one of many at hand, and less important than German attitudes toward other countries, especially Russia. Such ideas, however, did matter in shaping the sense of what the war was about, once it had started, when they maintained...