Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal (review)

It is difficult to find a modern naval commander more vilified by history than Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, who commanded U.S. naval forces during the critical 1942 Pacific battles at Coral Sea, Midway, the August invasion of Guadalcanal, and the subsequent naval battle of the Eastern Solomons. Fletcher’s critics include historian Samuel Eliot Morison, Admiral Ernest J. King, and, seemingly, the entire U.S. Marine Corps. Supposedly, Fletcher was to blame for failing to relieve Wake Island immediately after Pearl Harbor, for his timidity at Coral Sea where the Japanese sank the carrier Lexington, for being absent during much of the Midway encounter where the carrier Yorktown sank, and for abandoning the amphibious force at Guadalcanal which resulted in the stinging naval defeat at Savo Island while also endangering the tenuous marine foothold ashore.

John Lundstrom, known for his definitive histories of early Pacific War naval aviation, offers lengthy, detailed analyses of Fletcher’s operational commands during the first, critical nine months of the war. Lundstrom used primary sources not previously available, or ignored by others, including Japanese records, ships’ logs, radio messages, contemporary memoranda, personal correspondence, and interviews with those who served with Fletcher, in widely varying capacities, during this period. What emerges is a well-argued assessment of Fletcher that draws upon copious, multi-source evidence to repudiate effectively the innuendos and direct criticism leveled against him even though he successfully blunted the efforts of the superior Imperial Japanese Navy while preserving the U.S. Navy’s meager forces in the Pacific.

The evolution of American combat naval aviation during the war was based upon the hard lessons learned in its infancy and Fletcher was a significant part of the process. It was the non-aviator (black shoe) Fletcher who routinely sought and acted upon advice from aviation squadron commanders and junior aviators. Conversely, some senior aviators, such as Miles Browning and Marc Mitscher, convinced of their own expertise, made serious mistakes at Midway. It was Fletcher who repeatedly prevailed amid the fog of war, which included imprecise or conflicting intelligence estimates, communication gaps, aircraft losses, and the ever-present need to refuel his ships. The constant need to manage fuel resources is one of those logistics issues that are so critical and limiting to fleet operations yet so frequently dismissed by armchair experts who equate it with a lack of offensive effort. Typical of Lundstrom’s effectiveness is his counter to the hindsight-heavy criticism, based partially on a misinterpretation of Japanese intent, offered by Captain Richard Bates in the 1947 Naval War College assessment of Coral Sea. The seven chapters Lundstrom devotes to Guadalcanal also dispel the criticism leveled at Fletcher for his actions there. The level judgment and humility Fletcher repeatedly evinced during 1942 worked against his receiving a fair shake from history. The loss of his personal and command records when Yorktown sank at Midway along with those he was forced to leave behind in Saratoga after his relief, led Fletcher to defer postwar inquiries lest he misspeak. This made it easier for historians such as Morison to play favorites and to vilify Fletcher.

Black Shoe Carrier Admiral is a detailed, impeccably researched, well-written, and thoughtful analysis of Fletcher’s key role in the desperate, early months of the Pacific War. Lundstrom’s mastery of the primary sources and the latest secondary literature is complete and the evidence he offers successfully rehabilitates Fletcher and establishes him as a truly effective American naval commander of World War Two.