Mehr Angst vor dem Offizier als vor dem Feind? Eine mentalitätsgeschichtliche Studie zur preußischen Taktik im Siebenjährigen Krieg (review)

Whereas there exists a great amount of research in Germany about the Old Prussian Army, the relevant studies have not yet made it onto the Anglo-American market in a translated version. Therefore, a mostly distorted picture about this very important fighting force and the society it was connected to still prevails in the English speaking world.

The first scholar to successfully tackle the existing false picture was Dennis Showalter but his excellent book is by now eleven years old.

Möbius’s study Do you fear your own Officers more than the Enemy? sheds light on another misunderstood aspect of the Army of Frederick the Great, that of the relationship of officers and men and their means of communications during battle. The author has collected an unprecedented amount of sources about Old Fritz’s army. There are not only numerous regulations, orders and memoirs from officers, but also rare diaries and field post letters from enlisted Prussian soldiers.

The author offers a compact state-of-the-art account of the structure, weapons and tactics of Frederick’s regiments. This part of the book is equally useful for specialists as it is for beginners because Möbius makes an effort to explain all the contemporary military phrases and terms which have been often misunderstood in the past.

One of the greatest and toughest battles of the Seven Years War – The Battle of Prague, May 7, 1757 - is discussed in the following part of the book. The author shows that Frederick’s preference for the bayonet-only attack may have led to high casualties on the Prussian side in certain cases but was still successful when executed properly. The most important point, however, is that despite orders the bayonet-only attack never reached the status of doctrine because the Prussian commanders and their soldiers handled matters flexibly “according to the realities of the battlefield.”

The Prussian soldiers were anything else but “puppets” or “scratch from the bottom of the society” but acted independently when officers were killed. Though it was officially invented at the end of the nineteenth century it is possible that the famous Auftragstaktik has its roots in Frederick’s army.

The “soldiers honor” is identified as one of the most important motivations for troops to do their duty even under adverse conditions. Frederick the Great and his predecessor had done their utmost to elevate the status of the Prussian soldier in order to draw enough volunteers to create a quality army of considerable size in little Prussia, which had only a small number of inhabitants. This preparation paid off during the war as did training. Because of that the Prussian soldiers felt themselves to be superior which usually enabled them to outlast their opponents.

The drill and discipline did not create “marionette” soldiers but experienced independent individuals who possessed a variety of military abilities and thus could be used in different situations. Möbius gives examples of soldiers making the decision to close with the enemy despite the fact that they were ordered to retreat because they were low on bullets and the second battle line was already approaching. The soldiers had “voted with their feet” and were now supported by their officers who had tried in vain to make way for the following regiment. If Prussian soldiers, however, turned their backs they were later usually excused by their commanders or other watching Prussian officers, who recognized that a regiment could only take “so much”. Frederick, however, was much harsher in his judgment.

This superb book clearly demonstrates with a variety of examples directly taken from combat situations that there existed a professional understanding between Prussian soldiers, NCOs and officers. They possessed a variety of means to communicate back and forth with each other...