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  • General Walter Krueger: Unsung Hero of the Pacific War
  • George Eaton
General Walter Krueger: Unsung Hero of the Pacific War. By Kevin C. Holzimmer . Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007. ISBN 978-07006-1500-1. Maps. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 344. $39.95.

General Walter Krueger was lauded by Generals Eisenhower and MacArthur as one of the best commanders of World War II. As the Commander of 6th Army he was the senior ground commander in the Southwest Pacific Theater (SWPA). After the liberation of the Philippines, he was tagged with commanding the invasion of the Japanese home islands. Had the invasion occurred, Krueger would have commanded the largest amphibious invasion force in history. Despite these accomplishments, Krueger is a virtual unknown today. He was, under MacArthur's shadow, once dubbed "The Mystery Man of the Pacific." Kevin Holzimmer's biography pulls back the curtain and gives Krueger his full due.

Holzimmer explores Krueger's personal life, his ideas on the proper execution of command in wartime, and his role in the development of the American operational level of war. The greatest focus of the book is a reexamination of the campaigns in SWPA that show Krueger to not be the slow, over-cautious, and methodical commander so often depicted in cursory accounts, but an aggressive, forward thinking commander able to juggle simultaneous operations across thousands of miles.

Holzimmer does an exceptional job of describing operations in SWPA and Krueger's role in a continuous cycle of planning and execution. Krueger regularly commanded simultaneous two and three multidivision and multicorps operations separated by hundreds of miles. He had to balance several issues such as MacArthur's incessant pressure to speed up operations; problems of logistics support and manpower replacement; and a lack of amphibious shipping. What comes out in Holzimmer's portrayal is that Krueger managed all of this while at the same time resisting MacArthur's propensity for timetables based more on personal motivations and competition than on sound military considerations. Krueger's "slowness" in Leyte and in Luzon are shown to be sound decisions based on intelligence, logistics, manpower, and physical geography. Krueger showed his mettle by standing up to MacArthur in these instances and MacArthur demonstrated his confidence in Krueger by assigning him larger and more difficult operations. Krueger's juggling of events was a masterful demonstration of the operational level of war in a resource constrained theater. [End Page 959]

One difficulty in researching Krueger is the lack of personal documents. All family correspondence was destroyed after the war and Krueger never kept a diary. However, Holzimmer was diligent and uncovered scores of letters in the personal papers of Krueger's friends and colleagues. When combined with other collections, these personal letters give Holzimmer a sound archival basis for the description and conclusions.

There are some areas of the book I believe deserve more attention. I believe Krueger was more important in the development of amphibious operations and the move to the Rainbow plans than is reflected in this work. On another point, Holzimmer repeatedly notes that Krueger was unsatisfied with the intelligence coming from MacArthur's staff. One of the most effective methods devised by Krueger to meet intelligence needs was the creation of the Alamo Scouts as a long range reconnaissance unit. The unit is mentioned only in connection with the Admiralty Islands Operations. The Alamo Scouts were used constantly to gain accurate intelligence.

My only true concern with Holzimmer's interpretation is his crediting Krueger with development of U.S. Army operational doctrine in the 1939–42 period. I remain unconvinced that Krueger, though a serious student of the military art and aware of what the Germans were doing in Europe, was doing anything more than using the assets available to him in conjunction with a somewhat updated idea of maneuver warfare. Krueger's understanding of the complex interrelationship between ground, air, and sea forces is, in my opinion, more important than his role, or lack of role, in developing an American operational art.

These minor points aside, Kevin Holzimmer illuminates the contributions and accomplishments of one of World War II's most distinguished, private, and self-effacing senior commanders. General...

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