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  • The Norms of War: Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict
  • William Kautt
The Norms of War: Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict. By Theo Farrell. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005. ISBN 1-58826-361-4. Tables. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xii, 223. $49.95.

War is a difficult subject to write about. Theo Farrell tackles it using "norms," which explain its causation by establishing not only the "rules of the game," but "actually constitute the game itself—in other words, rules give meaning and form to social situations" (p. 8). He first establishes these norms and then uses them to examine military organization, mass industrial war, the nuclear revolution, and humanitarian intervention. In developing his thesis, he uses sociology, social and cultural histories of war, and public international law, in his view the new tools of international relations as a discipline. Strangely, Farrell does not explain why the components of his list are more valid than other potential areas of study.

While this reviewer is hardly one to attack someone over a footnote, Farrell's use of sources is somewhat troubling since it is inconsistent throughout and belies a lack of detail. Besides, he uses almost no primary sources. And, some of his sources are a bit dated. For instance, although he cites sources on the war in Iraq from as late as 2005, when he states that women are mostly excluded from combat (p. 19), Farrell cites only a study from 2001, completely ignoring the changes of the last three years. Further, he makes numerous grandiose proclamations (e.g., "That NATO [in Kosovo] violated the nonuse of force norm is beyond doubt" [p. 150]) that are unsupported by evidence.

Farrell sometimes seems to misunderstand how western militaries came into being: "They [the norms of conventional warfare and civilian supremacy] did not evolve by trial and error as the intrinsically 'best' way for militaries to organize and act" (p. 41). They were, in fact, developed precisely that way, by trial and error, victory and defeat—the Prussian military reform commission of 1807 is a perfect example. Military structures owe much to the lives and treasure spent in the past. Military organization is a matter of command and control of forces in battle. Since civilian supremacy over the military is predicated on the development of democracy, to speak of it prior to modern democracy is anachronistic.

By far the best of Farrell's chapters is the final one on humanitarian war. He begins with the provocative statement that the new humanitarian intervention is illegal in international law, but notes that sometimes "states must break the law to make new law . . . 'at times, the line between violations and emerging law may be difficult to draw'" (p. 140).

While his treatment of the subject is decidedly prosovereignty à la the UN, he walks a fine line between description and advocacy. Although he [End Page 602] argues against the legal propriety of humanitarian intervention (when not sanctioned by the UN) by invoking the sovereignty of each state, he neglects to stick to this logic—that the states who intervene are likewise sovereign (p. 142). Still, he notes that most states are reluctant to undertake such action (p. 143). After examining post–Gulf War I Iraq, Farrell takes on the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999, declaring the action illegal, by arguing that the Security Council did not authorize the use of force.

Farrell next goes into a discussion of the laws of war and admits "the obvious tension here between the need to foster aggression in combat and the norm against unnecessary brutality" (p. 156). He then proceeds to question the legality of targeting what he terms "civilian objects" (p. 161–63)—bridges, roads, railroads, etc. He finally claims that "NATO was on uncertain legal ground and this explains its reluctance to destroy Serbian civilian infrastructure. Only when all else failed, did it selectively do so" (p. 162). But Farrell never mentions the obvious counter; there was uncertain political support and this necessitated a gradual escalation of the bombing to keep the coalition from fragmenting.

It is unfortunate that Farrell did not spend more time developing this final chapter, indeed it could easily become...

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