Bunker Hill to Bastogne: Elite Forces and American Society (review)

Briton Cooper Busch's chronicle of elite forces in American history takes a different direction from most previous scholarly works on this topic, which seek to examine first and foremost the accomplishments of such units under fire. Instead of drums and bugles, Busch examines the social constructs that surrounded the creation of these units and sustained them throughout their baptism of fire. He argues that the term "elite" is not so easy to define when one considers the historical record. Are elite units those deliberately selected for their skills in field craft, stealth, and endurance such as French and Indian War rangers? Does the degree to which senior leaders consider missions hazardous beyond the norm, such as those assigned to Army paratroops or Marine infantry, propel units to elite status? Or is the title "elite" awarded to common units who have consistently performed in uncommonly heroic ways such as the Iron Brigade of the Army of the Potomac or the Stonewall Brigade of the Army of Northern Virginia?

Busch lays out his argument early. Physical stamina, intelligence, special skills, unit cohesion, and above all steadfastness characterize all of America's elites as it does the elites of other societies. However, American elites may have had a harder time achieving such status. American society generally feared its military until well into the twentieth century and has seldom been enamored of the idea of creating elite units in a society that sees itself, rightly or wrongly, as egalitarian in nature. Most military commanders until World War II had been reluctant to create elite units from within their ranks for some very sound reasons. Elite units have sometimes had checkered pasts. Rogers' Rangers, for example, had their successes against French and Indian foes but also earned a reputation for being disorderly while in camp. Furthermore, elite elements tend to draw away the best leaders from regular conventional units, particularly in the area of junior officers and NCOs, thereby undermining overall readiness. Nonetheless Busch argues elite units in one shape or another have been a part of American military history since before the Revolution. Much of the record shows their accolades well earned and in those instances in which performance has been less than desired, constructed myth has covered the gaps.

Busch presents his material well and the research behind the work is solid although not complete, perhaps due to the author's untimely death. For example, nowhere in the book does Busch examine the exploits of the OSS units who laid the groundwork for the modern Special Operations community. Busch only barely touches on the problems units had in maintaining their quality. Once created, they generally lacked a stateside training base up to the task of providing honed replacements in adequate numbers. Busch also fails to take on the problem of doctrine and the lack thereof. Generally, elite units come into being for a particular need not satisfied by more conventional elements. Tactics tended to lag behind the generation of doctrine, leading senior commanders to misuse elites. Darby's rangers provide a case in point. Problems with replacements and misuse by senior commanders markedly contributed to the debacle at Cisterno with an exasperated William Darby reportedly ordering his surviving elements to shoot Rangers attempting to surrender in order to stem the tide of collapse.

Busch's final and perhaps most important problem is that the term "elite" becomes increasingly ill defined in the last several chapters as he labels ever more units elite because of discriminators not exclusively based on assumptions made prior to combat. Is a tank destroyer unit elite because it has the difficult task of destroying German Panther and Tiger tanks while outgunned and out armored? Despite some success, the Army quickly backed away from tank destroyers as the bitter test of battle proved that tanks are the proper answer to tanks. Are the Tuskegee airmen elite because of the number of German...