In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Reviewed by:
  • Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War
  • Gary J. Bjorge
Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War. By John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006. ISBN 0-8047-5391-1. Photographs. Notes. References cited. Index. Pp. xiv, 362. $60.00.

This excellent book could not be more timely, dealing as it does with what the authors convincingly describe as a growing grave threat to the world as we know it, namely, China's military preparations for "the coming confrontation with Taiwan" (p. 3) and the possible use of nuclear weapons in a war with the United States. For the authors, the fear that such a catastrophe could occur was a powerful motivation for undertaking their research and writing. As they state in the preface, "So staggering is the potential human cost of conflict that those who study it do so in the hope that we can make a difference in preventing it" (p. xii). What is troubling is that the authors themselves are not very hopeful. They lament the rise in tensions caused by Chinese preparations for battle and the threats of hostile action against Taiwan and United States military forces that are emanating from Beijing. They worry that "as the climate of hostility worsens and the tide shifts toward war, no stream of concern and no search for peace have appeared to meet the shifting tide of hostility" (pp. 279–80). They appeal to the governments in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington to "temper extremist pronouncements and actions and redirect national policies to avert a final confrontation"(p. 280). "Failing that," they conclude, "imagined enemies will become real and China's war preparations will no longer posit an uncertain conflict" (p. 280).

Lewis and Xue do not view China as being intrinsically hostile to the United States. They believe that if the Taiwan issue was resolved to Beijing's satisfaction, "Beijing's military preparations would undoubtedly atrophy . . . and its national programs and social energies would concentrate almost exclusively . . . on China becoming a global economic and political power" (p. 275). The problem, however, is that in reality mainland-Taiwan relations are at an impasse and Beijing is becoming increasingly impatient with Taiwan's independent status. For now, with the Olympic Games coming to Beijing in 2008, the Chinese government is willing to simply continue its diplomatic, political, economic, and psychological warfare against Taiwan as it presses ahead with preparations for military action to change the status quo. Exactly when Beijing will resort to the military option is unclear, but Lewis and Xue take the position that the future definitely holds a "more deadly civil war that no one wants but all see coming" (p. 3). They also feel that this destructive war will probably lead to an even greater war that would see Chinese forces attacking United States naval forces in the Taiwan area and even United States bases in Japan.

With these dire possibilities in mind, the detailed descriptions and careful analyses that fill the pages of this work inspire serious reflection and contemplation. China's current military transformation, like the transformations that occurred in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, shows the classic pattern of a military transforming to meet the challenges posed by an external threat. As described in this study, in the 1960s and 1970s, for example, the Chinese were developing forces and operational doctrine to counter [End Page 608] the threat from the Soviet Union. What is unsettling to Lewis and Xue is that in China today the main threat is considered to be the United States. Worse yet, the Chinese analysis of American performance during the Gulf War of 1991 and the Iraq War of 2003 have led them to develop a preemptive strike doctrine. Looking at the effects produced by American precision munitions, Chinese military strategists and commanders have reached the conclusion that to wait for the first attack before acting is to invite defeat. One result of this type of thinking is the use of preemptive strikes to destroy notional American carrier battle groups in training exercises (p. 265).

Besides examining and explaining the significance of this most recent development in operational doctrine, this work looks...

pdf

Share