Rethinking the Principles of War (review)

This book is not a successor to John Alger's seminal The Quest for Victory (Greenwood, 1982). It is an anthology of essays by defense scholars attempting to come to terms with the changes in the character of war and defense requirements in the contemporary world. The authors have produced a book deserving considerably wider reading than the $75 price tag will permit.

The essays are papers from a year-long senior seminar series sponsored by the Defense Office for Force Transformation, headed by the late Vice Admiral (Retired) Arthur K. Cebrowski, Johns Hopkins's Applied Physics Laboratory, and the U.S. Naval Institute, to "examine the future of warfare and the underlying principles of war [emphasis added] with an aim of educating future military strategists and leaders." The essays are diverse in focus and of a high standard of composition. They suffer a weakness in so far as the authors do not always share the same technical vocabulary or a precise view of what we mean when we say "principles of war." The twenty-nine essays are grouped under five heads: "An American Way of War?"; "Operational Arts: Conventional Warfare"; "Operational Arts: Irregular Warfare"; "Post-Conflict and Stability Operations"; and "Intelligence—Winning the Silent Wars."

Colin Gray's "The American Way of War; Critique and Implications" frames seven essays, more or less bounded by the question of whether there is such a thing and if so, what are its limits? Gray identifies and critiques five claims he argues constitute the case for an American Way of War (p. 23). He then assesses the influence of what he admits to on adapting the armed forces to new demands. Among his most trenchant points is the confusion he sees between notions of "principles of war" and "principles of warfare" (p. 4). This distinction is taken up later, more or less, by Antulio Echevarria, in an essay titled "Principles of War or Principles of Battle." Jon T. Sumida finishes the section with a sterling essay, "Pitfalls and Prospects: The Misuses and Uses of Military History and Classical Military Theory in the 'Transformation Era.'" This essay should be required reading in all history and political science departments, and in military colleges, not least for his classical statement of the problem of dialog between historians and political scientists (pp. 137–38).

Other essays worthy of special note are those by Admiral Sir Ian Forbes, RN, and Brigadier General David Fastabend, USA, on conventional operations, and that of Lieutenant Colonel (Ret) Frank Hoffman, USMC, on "Principles of War for the Savage Wars of Peace." Indeed, Hoffman's principles should receive serious consideration by those composing the new Army and Marine Corps manual for Insurgency Operations, with which Hoffman is engaged. There are five excellent essays on "Post Conflict and Stability Operations" and seven on Intelligence, which the reviewer is hesitant to judge as beyond his competence.

The value of this book to anyone interested in military topics, historical or contemporary, lies in its ability to cause one to think in new ways about old problems, which is real transformation. I recommend it.