Intelligence and Statecraft: The Use and Limits of Intelligence in International Society (review)

This book comprises a collection of essays that grew out of a symposium on intelligence and international relations organized under the auspices of International Security Studies at Yale University. The symposium brought together intelligence scholars from both sides of the Atlantic. I will first summarize the various chapters to give the reader a flavor for the whole, and then concentrate on the two I found most intriguing.

The essay by Peter Jackson provides a conceptual framework for discussing the uses and limits of intelligence in history. More on this chapter later. Alan Sked's contribution illustrates the consequences of a lack of reliable intelligence which led the Austrian Army to occupy Ferrara, Italy, in 1847. The chapter by Maureen O'Connor Witter traces the development of the military attaché from the nineteenth century. More on her efforts shortly. David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye and Jennifer Siegel both examine the importance of imperial policy to the emergence of permanent intelligence structures in Russia and in Great Britain in their essays. The former uses the role of intelligence in the competition between Russia and Britain in Afghanistan and Tibet while the latter argues that the British experiences in Africa added stimulus to the trend in professionalization in the half century before World War I. Christopher Bell's essay underlines the importance of the economic factors that became central to intelligence and the British strategy for war in the Far East during the interwar period. The difficulty of reconstructing the dynamics of Soviet intelligence work before the German invasion of Russia in 1941 is the subject of David Stone's chapter. Paul Mandrell's article illustrates the importance of scientific intelligence during the Cold War effort to contain Soviet technological progress. The final chapter in the volume, by Mary Sarotte, discusses the role of East German intelligence as both a tool of and actor in foreign policy. The editors conclude that there is a need for more research into the historical evolution of permanent intelligence organizations and their role in international politics.

Peter Jackson argues in his excellent essay that despite the tremendous changes in the character of intelligence, the chief function of intelligence remains to reduce uncertainty in politics and war. He also maintains that the limits to the usefulness of intelligence have also remained constant. His chapter attempts to trace the development of intelligence as a tool to guide decisionmaking from antiquity to the present. He effectively discusses the limitations and enduring constraints of intelligence: time and space, organization, political influences, and the limits of human perception. His two conclusions are significant and enduring. First, truly objective intelligence assessments are an ideal rather than an objective reality. Second, foreign and security policy will always be formulated in an atmosphere of uncertainty.

Maureen O'Connor Witter traces the rise and development of the military attaché from the nineteenth century and links this to the increasing demand for intelligence generated by the requirements of modern war. As a historian who has written extensively about military attachés, I applaud O'Connor's paper and found several fascinating new tidbits of information. This remains a fertile field for cultivation.