Command Failure in War: Psychology and Leadership (review)

Indiana University Press chose an apt dust jacket for Command Failure in War. Juxtaposed against formal military photographs of Robert E. Lee and Douglas Haig are Confederate dead at Gettysburg and the mudscape of Ypres. Apparently the publishers caught one of the authors' themes: psychological dysfunction is nowhere more costly than in commanders at war.

The late Professor Pois (1940–2004) and Professor Langer, both of the University of Colorado, combined their interests in history and psychology to offer an insightful look into the minds of commanders. Pois and Langer choose to explain rather than excuse, and refrain from finding a paranoid schizophrenic behind every saber. On the contrary—the work is more historical narrative than post-mortem psychoanalysis, and its strength lies in its inquisitive approach.

Illuminating the actions of Frederick the Great, Napoleon, McClellan, Lee, Hood, Haig, Churchill, and "Bomber" Harris, as well as Hitler, the authors show us men who suffered from a rigidity that "constrains an individual's freedom of thought beyond acceptable limitations." From research into a broad range of sources—from Hans Delbrück to Tim Travers—the authors have fashioned a valuable inquiry; one that helps readers to see commanders not as two-dimensional "goods" or "bads," but as human beings. Additionally, Pois and Langer create their models from the historical evidence, and acknowledge that there is no "overarching psychological explanation" for the rigidity they observe. Moreover, they examine their subjects in discrete situations—Napoleon in Russia, Hood at Franklin, etc., and show additional respect for their readers by a limited use of psychological jargon and an assumption of general knowledge.

Few readers would be unfamiliar with the brutalization of Frederick and Hitler by their fathers, and the authors show how these men use aggression both as a military tactic and as a means of addressing personal issues. However, the authors do not claim this aggression is solely caused by paternal drubbings. Refreshingly, enemy incompetence is also seen as a factor in the success of all the commanders considered. Clearly Pois and Langer understand context. (Haig may indeed have suffered from cognitive dissonance. In 1917, however, he also had more artillery shells than his opponent, and could be expected to use them to the exclusion of other options.)

While individual chapters could use more analysis within the historical narrative, and while the authors might have included an ancient or medieval commander or two, the conclusions are first rate because they are framed with the acknowledgement that attempting to explain human behavior is a perilous undertaking indeed. Even so, the concluding chapter justifies what Pois and Langer call "personal schema impenetrable to choice," and reminds readers that "a common response to heavy stress is to cling to established beliefs or patterns of behavior."

The book is a valuable contribution to the literature because it offers no checklists à la Jomini or any of the hundreds of current "leadership" works, but rather leans toward a dialectic of sorts. Still, the authors' simple insights, ignored in practice, show us why we have Confederate dead at Gettysburg and a muddy Ypres: "The one inescapable fact is that regardless of advances in equipment, there remains that human element which can subvert the contributions of any technology." Just so.