Airpower Advantage: Planning the Gulf War Air Campaign, 1989-1991 (review)

The Gulf War victory of 1991 was one of the most decisive in modern history. In less than six weeks "the world's fourth largest army" was broken and Kuwait was liberated. Only afterwards did the U.S. realize that decisiveness requires more than battlefield victory. Yet, the 1991 victory, albeit incomplete, was brilliant. How it was planned is instructive.

Diane Putney, an Air Force historian when she wrote this book, has done a masterful job of documenting the air campaign planning effort.

General Norman Schwarzkopf was concerned about two things in early August 1990: how to defend Saudi Arabia if Iraq continued its advance south from Kuwait; and how to "punish" Saddam if he did something "crazy" like begin killing civilian hostages. He called the Air Force chief of staff to ask for an air option. His own planners were not up to the task, and he had already ordered his air component commander, Lieutenant General Chuck Horner, to head for Saudi Arabia to organize a defense and prepare for the arrival of coalition forces.

Coincidentally, an Air Force colonel named John Warden was already working on just such a plan. Significantly, Warden envisioned a strategic air campaign that would not just punish Saddam, but would engineer his downfall. In six days of intense bombing, Saddam's leadership base, industrial infrastructure, power grid, and transportation network would be paralyzed. At that point, before U.S. and coalition ground forces were even in the theater, Saddam would realize all was lost and withdraw his troops from Kuwait.

The rapidity and intensity of these proposed strategic air attacks were an essential component. Warden, who had flown combat missions in Vietnam as a junior officer, detested the failed policy of gradual escalation through airpower, termed "Rolling Thunder." He opted for a codename that would denote something quite different.

"Instant Thunder" was briefed to Schwarzkopf on 10 August and "the Bear" was delighted: "Shit, I love it" (p. 57). He instructed Warden to brief General Colin Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and then take it to Horner. Schwarzkopf saw the air plan as the first step of an offensive strategy to oust Iraq from Kuwait.

Powell also liked the air campaign plan, but Horner was another story. Like Warden, Horner had also been marked by his Vietnam experiences. To him, the notion that someone in the Pentagon, thousands of miles distant, with no responsibility if things went wrong, would attempt to impose an air plan on him, was unthinkable. It smacked of the Washington-based micromanagement of Vietnam that had proved disastrous. Yet, Horner saw the value of Instant Thunder as a strategic concept, so he directed his planners to flesh out the plan and make it executable. Like Schwarzkopf and Powell, Horner rejected the claim that six days of air strikes would bring Iraq to its knees. A ground assault would be necessary, and air would play a key role in that phase.

The air campaign grew and evolved, but early on Schwarzkopf made a breathtaking decision: he directed that the goal of the air campaign was to knock out 50 percent of the Iraqi Army prior to the start of a coalition ground offensive. In short, he wanted airpower to render the Iraqi force "combat ineffective" before his own troops even stepped off. Over the next four months the numbers of coalition forces grew dramatically, but the 50 percent attrition requirement remained.

This is an excellent book that combines prodigious research in primary documents with interviews of the major players. At the same time, Putney describes events and people with clarity, balance, and insight. There are some shortcomings. Because this is an Air Force official history, some will claim the roles of the planners from the other services and coalition partners have been slighted. Indeed, problems encountered during the planning process between Horner's staff and the other participants...