German War Planning, 1891-1914: Sources and Interpretations (review)

One of the historian's tasks is, regrettably and essentially, to fill in the gaps left by the lack of historical evidence. It is regrettable that the gaps exist at all. But it is equally regrettable that our efforts to close those gaps, however Herculean, must yield only imperfect results. On the subject of German war planning in the decades leading up to the First World War, the gaps are many and large. Over the last half-decade or so, Terence Zuber has chosen to fill them in a certain way. While his efforts have shown how truly weak the foundation is that supports much of the existing historiography of German war planning, particularly Gerhard Ritter's contribution to it, they remain imperfect, and being so have sparked a heated controversy—a Schlieffenstreit of sorts. Zuber insists that the Schlieffen plan never existed, and that the concept paper (Denkschrift) that the erstwhile chief of the general staff penned in 1905–6 was merely a ploy to argue for an increase in the size of the Reichsheer. Even if Schlieffen's 1905 memorandum is everything Zuber claims it is, and nothing more, it would not necessarily prove that a corresponding war plan did not also exist. What Zuber lacks is persuasive corroborating evidence—a note from Schlieffen or the younger Moltke, for instance—to substantiate the claim that the 1905–6 concept was merely a ploy. Annika Mombauer's excellent biography of Moltke (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War) certainly does not mention any such letter. Ironically, had Zuber not exceeded the available evidence with this particular claim, he would still have made a significant contribution to our knowledge of German war planning.

In the volume reviewed here, Zuber makes available in translated form some important primary and secondary sources, some of which have lain unexamined in the East German archives: Hellmuth Greiner's The German Intelligence Estimate in the West, 1885–1914; Wilhelm Dieckmann's Der Schlieffenplan; notes from Wilhelm von Dommes's briefing on the German war plan in the east to 1905; several of Schlieffen's staff rides, 1894, 1901, 1902, 1903 (all east), and 1904 (west); the 1905 war game; the purported Schlieffen plan; Moltke's 1908 staff ride (west); parts of the actual war plan of 1914 (5th and 6th Army); and commentaries by Hans Delbrück, Hermann von Kuhl, Wolfgang Foerster, Wilhelm Groener, and Erich Ludendorff on the German war plan of 1914, and its relationship or lack thereof to Schlieffen's 1905–6 concept. Cumulatively, these sources show that the German war plan of 1914 was much more complex, and in certain respects substantially different, than the "Schlieffen plan" that Ritter had critiqued; they also reveal that Moltke had good reasons for following a different course of action. However, no reasonable German scholar would dispute these points any longer.

This volume will undoubtedly help inform the Schlieffenstreit—not so much for German scholars (since many of us can in fact read the standard script in which these manuscripts are written), but for students and other researchers interested in war planning in general. The sources in it are, however, not likely to tip the scales decisively in favor of one side of the debate or the other: they will be read somewhat differently by each. For instance, Ludendorff's article (pp. 297–301) in this volume contradicts von Kuhl's account, but it also challenges Zuber's claim that Schlieffen's concept was merely a ploy, though Zuber apparently reads it differently. Of course, since Zuber has a stake in the debate, his personal bias (conscious or not) must be accounted for in these translations. Overfilling history's gaps comes at a price.

Additionally, and once again regrettably, many gaps still remain, and this volume will not close all of them: the general staff covered its tracks too well after the war. As...