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Reviewed by:
  • The Secret War of Hut 3, and: Ultra’s Arctic War, and: The Official History of British Sigint, 1914–1945
  • Ernest L. Bell
The Secret War of Hut 3. The Bletchley Archive, vol. 1. Edited by John Jackson. Milton Keynes, U.K.: Military Press, 2002. ISBN 0-84520-193-9. Figures. Glossary. References. Pp. x, 115. £25.
Ultra’s Arctic War. The Bletchley Archive, vol. 2. Edited by John Jackson. Milton Keynes, U.K.: Military Press, 2003. ISBN 0-85420-224-2. Maps. Photographs. Appendixes. References. Index. Pp. ii, 127. £25.
The Official History of British Sigint, 1914–1945. vol. 1 (part 1). The Bletchley Archive, vol. 3. By Frank Birch. Edited by John Jackson. Milton Keynes, U.K.: Military Press, 2004. ISBN 0-85420-273-8. Diagrams. References. Index. Pp. xli, 184. £32.99.

Ultra, Bletchley Park, and Magic are words that have supposedly transformed the history of World War II. One would think, or hope, that books such as those under review here would somehow provide the reader with more knowledge and understanding of Signals Intelligence or Sigint on a broader scale. Such, however, is not the case in Vol. 3—The Official History of British Sigint 1944–1945, written by Frank Birch, Official Historian, British Sigint, and edited by John Jackson. The role of the United States in the interception, interpretation, and distribution of the intercepted material to the proper authority is almost completely ignored. True, these are publications meant to record history, but one expects a full picture, not just one from the prejudiced British point of view.

One would expect that this book might be some sort of a history of World War II based upon the many intercepts. That is not the case: it reflects only the history of the radio interceptions and the extensive interservice bureaucratic bickering that took place. The reader is left with the terrible thought that these various internal squabbles within the United Kingdom's service community could easily have caused a serious disruption or even destruction of the ability to intercept the enemies' communications. Consequently, the war could have been lengthened, or possibly even been lost.

On the other hand, volume 1 of The Secret War of Hut 3, does recognize the arrival of the Americans at Bletchley Park and their serious contributions to the overall war effort. All in all, it presents an unquestionably truer picture of what happened to the material after it was intercepted and processed into a useable state. It is easy to overlook the fact that the interception and breaking of a coded message is not the end of the process. The initial decision to be made is: to which service should the message be sent. Then the product must be further examined, analyzed, indexed, and decisions made as to its final destination.

The word "analyze" must be used with care. At the beginning of hostilities the staff at Bletchley Park (BP) was toiling under a high-level mandate not to analyze the various intercepted materials, but rather to send them along to the heads of the various ministries in London and elsewhere. In some instances they were even sent directly to the Prime Minister. It should not be overlooked that in spite of these orders BP directed that all messages be indexed for every possible word or name. These files eventually filled [End Page 1241] rooms. On many occasions reference to these records influenced the conduct of the war, even through they seemed of little consequence at the time. This came about in spite of the supposedly firm policy to the contrary. There was also an occasional research paper from BP but they were always marked "not necessarily the views of the Ministry." The burning question now is—where is this index? Was it destroyed along with some other BP material or is it sequestered in some secret hideaway? What a prize for historians!

An apparent valid criticism of SHAEF's "A" Force security is well covered. It was only because of the Germans' overwhelming belief in the Enigma's lack of vulnerability that the entire high level BP operation was not brought to its knees.

It must not be overlooked...

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