Technology and Military Doctrine: Essays on a Challenging Relationship (review)

I. B. Holley, Jr., has spent more than sixty years thinking and writing about the development of military doctrine, and especially its relationship to technology in a rapidly changing world. Enlisting in the U.S. Army Air Forces during World War II, he served as an aerial gunnery instructor. After five years on active duty he went on to pursue a distinguished academic career, retiring as a professor of history at Duke University. He also stayed in the U.S. Air Force Reserve, retiring as a major general in 1981. In his final assignment he served as assistant to the commander of the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama.

Published by the Air University Press, this book is a collection of eleven articles and essays written by Professor Holley between 1953 and 1997. Each chapter is a stand-alone little gem, clearly written, tightly argued, and illustrated with historical examples. The essays overlap, of course, and many of Professor Holley's main points are repeated multiple times; but all are key insights that merit repetition. Holley continually reminds us what doctrine is, and very importantly what it is not. Military doctrine, quite simply, is that which is officially approved to be taught in service schools or in operational units conducting training. Mostly derived from past experience, doctrine is authoritative in the sense that it is an official recognition of what has usually worked best. Doctrine is not, however, prescriptive, mandatory, or rigidly binding. It is only suggestive, and it never restricts the freedom of action of the commanders in the field who must deal with constantly evolving situations. Holley steadfastly opposes any efforts to make any part of military doctrine mandatory, even in the name of jointness among the services. To do so, he argues, would lead at best to rigidity and group-think, and at worst to doctrine being ignored completely by those in the field.

Doctrine, of course, is never static, and it changes constantly as weapon technologies advance. Yet there always seems to be a gap between the technological state of the art and current doctrine. As Holley points out again and again, the most dramatic advancement in military technology is useless on the battlefield until an effective doctrine has been developed for its practical use. And as a new technology matures, the corresponding doctrine must advance accordingly. The airplane, which in the course of little more than 100 years has gone from nonexistent to being one of the most diverse, complex, and dominating of contemporary military technologies, is just one of the more dramatic examples.

Holley also argues that the development of doctrine cannot be left to chance or to random natural evolution. Militaries must manage their doctrinal processes. That requires an organization specifically committed to the evaluation and development of doctrine, and as importantly a system for communicating and disseminating that doctrine to those charged with applying it. Finally, it requires a well-designed and managed system to collect and evaluate after action reports from the field and a constant check on what really works best in practice. These are not easy things for military organizations to do, especially in time of war. It requires clear-headed leadership at the highest levels, and a willingness to make the necessary resources available—especially what Holley calls "time to think."

As a collection of originally discrete essays, the book contains not only overlaps, but gaps. I very much would like to have read about Professor Holley's thoughts on the revision of German tactical doctrine presided over by Ludendorff on the Western Front between late 1916 and early 1918. It was perhaps history's most dramatic example of an army giving itself a complete doctrinal overhaul while engaged in a massive war. The book, too, would have benefited from an index. But these are minor quibbles. This slim but...