The Road to Valley Forge: How Washington Built the Army That Won the Revolution (review)

John Buchanan tells a familiar story, told again and again for more than two centuries, the story of how George Washington and the Continental Army survived humiliating defeat in their attempt to defend New York City in 1776, revived their fortunes and hopes for the Revolution in small but stunning victories at Trenton and Princeton, weathered a setback at Brandywine and another at Germantown, and battered but still intact in late 1777 made winter camp in a miserable mudhole known as Valley Forge. Buchanan's version emphasizes how Washington "developed [his army] from a rabble into the makings of a professional force" (p. xi), implying that previous historians have missed this vital point. Along the way, he does not hesitate to glance ahead in his tale, reminding the reader how, for example, the later, unhappy careers of Charles Lee and Horatio Gates should cast doubt on their role and reputations in this early period of the war. His readiness to incorporate eventual outcomes into what purports to be a story of cause and effect did not inspire confidence in this reader, nor did the author's taste for musty stylistic devices, warning us that the later role of Friedrich Steuben "awaits its place in the narrative" (p. 33), or apostrophizing Washington—"No, General, you made an unwise decision that night, and you were lucky to get away with it" (p. 229).

But he tells the old story with a straightforward vigor, relying on well-known published sources and the most recent published editions of the papers of Washington, Greene, and Hamilton, as well as the invaluable compilation from British archives by K. G. Davies. He cites modern authorities when he agrees with their judgments, and usually parks them in an endnote when he does not. Old as the tale may be, he sweeps the reader along, deftly incorporating large chunks of primary evidence into the narrative, and sketching a full picture of what the enemy was doing and thinking. Unsurprisingly, there are no startling new revelations. The author is not uncritical of Washington, but as he moves from the high point of Trenton-Princeton to the failures at Brandywine and Germantown in 1777 he relies more on repeated assertion than on evidence to make the case that both Washington and his army were steadily improving. Repeating the well-established legend that Friedrich Steuben completed decisively at Valley Forge the great work begun by Washington, he does not argue his case from the evidence, but instead attacks the recent, excellent book by Wayne Bodle, Valley Forge Winter: Civilians and Soldiers in War (University Park, Pa.: Penn State University Press, 2002), who heretically suggests that the later performance of the army at the battle of Monmouth hardly proves the profound and lasting influence of Steuben's training. Why Buchanan chose to attack Bodle, who offers far more evidence for the positive results of Steuben's work than does Buchanan himself, is a mystery.

In the first paragraph of his preface, Buchanan draws a line between those who are concerned with the impact of war on society and his own book, whose focus is not on the politicians who make revolutions or the civilians who suffer through them, but on "the soldiers who win them" (p. xi). Fair enough, except that the soldiers of this army were not far removed from the civilians whose war they fought. The author's drawing of the line between two kinds of military history invites us to compare his book to another work, published in the same year: David Hackett Fischer's Washington's Crossing (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), whose 379 pages of text closely parallel the first 224 pages of The Road to Valley Forge, down to the end of the winter-spring campaign of 1777 in New Jersey. Fischer has dug more deeply in the record...