The North American Democratic Peace: Absence of War and Security Institution-Building in Canada-US Relations, 1867-1958 (review)

Canada's refusal to participate in the American-led invasion of Iraq is a pointed and necessary reminder that despite decades of security cooperation, Canada and the United States do not always agree on key issues. Indeed, as historians such as myself love to point out whenever given the rare chance to do so, for over 150 years Canada and the United States were not friends but wary strategic rivals. On two occasions, from 1775 to 1781 and then 1812 to 1814, the two nations fought each other. As late as the 1930s, on both sides of the 49th Parallel, military officers had devised plans to attack across that supposedly undefended frontier. But the myth of the undefended border remains firmly entrenched amongst regular Canadians and Americans, and their leaders. Still, in a frequently savage world, the fact that peace, even the wary kind, has reigned along that frontier for nearly two centuries is something to celebrate, even if we do not quite understand why it has been so. In his important study, Canadian political scientist Stéphane Roussel of the Université du Québec à Montréal tackles this important question.

As Roussel rightly points out, most small states abutting great powers cannot boast the great good fortune often taken for granted by Canadians. Not only has the United States not employed military force against Canada since 1814, on frequent occasions, despite America's great strategic preponderance, Canada has accomplished two things: it has often successfully resisted American pressure in security-related matters, usually without substantial retaliation; and second, despite a great disparity in power, Canada has entered into security arrangements with the United States that protected its interests and allowed Canada a substantial voice in the making of continental security policy. The former Soviet Union's east European satellites never enjoyed such a celebrated status in the frigid Cold War.

How did this unusual arrangement develop? Roussel's subtle argument is that over the course of decades, as decision-making elites in Canada and the United States came to recognize the basic liberal-democratic nature of the other's political system, they found it easier to assign benign motives to the other. In this context, and with a respect for the rule of law derived from a common British imperial source, both nations strove to build bilateral institutions that embodied the norms of equality, reciprocity, and consultation. My description of Roussel's thesis may be putting matters too simply, but the constraints a reviewer must face are substantial. Roussel's book makes his case over two hundred well-researched pages. Historians often revel in assaulting the propensity of their colleagues in political science to spin out complex models and theories, sometimes without acknowledging their own methodological shortcomings. And the book's first half presents a lengthy and complex discussion of international relations theory that some may find intimidating. If so, that would be a shame, for Roussel's discussion abounds in scholarly richness. No historian who discusses Canadian-American security relations in any meaningful way can afford to ignore how he places his assertions within, and often against, accepted academic wisdom. This is an important book, and it should be read by Canadians and Americans alike, especially those to whom we entrust our mutual security. As Roussel correctly asserts in his conclusion, the institutional fabric of North American defense, especially in the wake of 9/11, has yet to take its final shape or size. Policy makers making those decisions should be cognizant of our entangled security past as they ponder our complex security future.