Soviet Operational and Tactical Combat in Manchuria, 1945 'August Storm', and: The Soviet Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, 1945 (review)

This reviewer has had the pleasure of reading many of David Glantz's works on the Eastern Front in World War Two and the privilege of reviewing several of those efforts. In so doing, I had noticed a pattern: Glantz's research and grasp of detail has always been extensive, but his writing in earlier works was often dry. In later works, Glantz has shown a more deft writing touch, particularly in books such as Zhukov's Greatest Defeat, Stumbling Colossus, and When Titans Clash (co-authored by Jonathan House). Unfortunately, Glantz's two volume history of the Soviet offensive in Manchuria, while maintaining a high standard of research and detail, is so mechanistically written as to be useful mostly as a source book, not as a readable narrative of the campaign.

Glantz's theme in both volumes is straightforward, to show that the Soviets executed their offensive in Manchuria with tremendous skill. The first, Strategic, book states that the "Manchurian campaign represented and still represents the highest stage of military art the Red Army reached during its operations during the Second World War" (p. xxvi). Similarly, the Operational and Tactical volume posits that "the massive scale of the Soviet attack was matched by the audaciousness, skill, and relentlessness with which it was conducted" (p. xvii). This reviewer is sympathetic to efforts that dispel the myth that Soviet victories depended solely on a massive advantage in numbers, and Glantz makes a good general case for the skill of Soviet commanders and the efficacy of their doctrine. However, Glantz occasionally seems to overstate his case. Both volumes are replete with descriptions of Soviet advances against negligible opposition, Japanese disarray and lack of resources, and spectacular offensives after the dropping of the American atomic bomb and the initiation of surrender discussions between Soviet and Japanese officials. In short, the overall shortage of Japanese troops and equipment, as well as the hopelessness of their situation—despite the Japanese soldiers' fighting prowess—make it hard to measure Soviet skill on the battlefield. Given this caveat, Glantz has a strong case for Soviet skill at achieving surprise and overcoming difficult terrain, but a less firm claim concerning the Red Army's skill with echelons, maneuver, and formations.

The structure of the two volumes follows an interesting approach that has much merit. The Strategic book gives an overview of the campaign and sets the "big picture" for the reader. The Operational and Tactical volume contains a selection of case studies, which provide greater detail on the operations of the Soviet forces. The two part structure allows the author to make his overall case before looking at specific operational and tactical fights. While this method could lead to a selective use of case studies, Glantz has chosen his samples well. There are examples of major mechanized offensives, advances over tremendously difficult terrain, battles for fortified regions, amphibious operations, and many other varieties of tactical combat. A more traditional, strictly chronological, approach would not have allowed for the detail found in the individual case studies, and Glantz should be applauded for this fresh approach.

Unfortunately, the strengths of Glantz's work are marred by a writing style that makes both volumes a difficult read. These writing weaknesses are revealed early in the first, Strategic, volume. Of 346 pages of 'text' (more on Glantz's text below) in this volume, 181 pages are devoted to planning for the offensive. More than half of the book discusses preparations, unit structures, terrain, the whole accompanied by overwhelming statistical data. Often tables of statistical information are repeated in the narrative and the reader is left in...