Breaking the Backcountry: The Seven Years' War in Virginia and Pennsylvania, 1754-1765 (review)

Over the past several years, there have been a number of excellent studies of violence and war in the American backcountry during the eighteenth century, including those by Warren Hofstra, James Titus, Marjoleine Kars, and Wayne Lee. Matthew Ward has certainly joined this list of scholars with his study of the backcountry of Virginia and Pennsylvania during what is known in America as the French and Indian War, and the residual fighting after it known as "Pontiac's Rebellion." Ward's inquiry explores the military operations of the British and Americans during the 1750s and 1760s, and provides a detailed analysis of an insecure backcountry society, whose frontier inhabitants were often the victims of Indian raids, and of the difficulties colonial and imperial officials faced in recruiting provincial regiments. He focuses on critical diplomatic relations as well, between land-hungry colonial authorities and increasingly embittered Native Americans, who faced trying times once the French surrendered Canada to the British in 1763.

Far from being a backwater to a typical imperial struggle fought in Continental Europe, for French and British belligerents the most crucial theatre of the Seven Years' War was in America. Ward's main contribution is to bring the backcountry to center stage within this larger conflict, the cause of which cannot be understood without comprehending the important struggle for the fertile lands of the Ohio River Valley. After two British attempts to capture the strategic "Forks of the Ohio" were defeated in 1754 and 1755, devastating Indian "raids on the backcountry formed a central part of French strategy" (p. 45). Waging war in the backcountry was extremely difficult for British, American, and French forces and their Indian allies as well. Moving armies through huge tracts of wilderness over mountainous terrain created logistical nightmares for soldiers, while quick-striking, highly mobile Indian raiding parties achieved devastating results against poorly-defended, isolated white settlements. The people of the frontier seemed both unable and at times unwilling to help defend the backcountry from Indian and French depredations.

By the middle of the war, British commanders were able to succeed only by taking the war beyond the backcountry and destroying Native American towns and resources. The expeditions of John Forbes and Henry Bouquet, in 1758 and 1764 respectively, demonstrated the efficacy of this strategy. Once the French left Canada, the Indians found arms and ammunition scarce, which severely limited their ability to resist British and provincial attacks. Despite initial success, Indians who attacked western British posts from 1763 to 1765 in "Pontiac's War" lacked French support and ultimately failed.

This is a well-written study, with but minor flaws. One wonders why in his study Ward barely mentions Maryland and North Carolina, since both colonies had exposed back country settlements during the war and faced societal and logistical dilemmas similar to those of the colonies he describes. Also, given the detailed portrait Ward gives of the Native American involvement during the war years and in diplomacy, the limited French perspective—and paucity of French sources—is noticeable. Nevertheless, Breaking the Backcountry is a rewarding contribution to the scholarship on early American warfare.