A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea (review)

By the time the armistice of 27 July 1953 ended the fighting in Korea, most Canadians had a fading memory of that three-year-old conflict. But Canada's "Forgotten War," as it became known, deserved no such a fate. Now only with the appearance of this book fifty years after the closing event, is the complete story being told. And how interesting it is.

William Johnston—one of Canada's longtime official historians—sets out to redress the neglect and to provide a very important new analysis about how Canadian land forces performed as part of the U.S.-led United Nations Forces quickly raised to stem North Korean and later Chinese Communist aggression in South Korea. His aim is to produce a comprehensive account of Canada's 25th Brigade which fought for three years on that peninsula in the Far East. His story details the Canadian operations and puts them in the proper context of the larger conflict. It critically examines tactics, operations, training, recruiting and leadership. It challenges the conventional interpretation which deprecates the quality of the first Canadian Korean contingent. This body was raised not from the Canadian regular army, but as a "Special Force" of citizen volunteers most of whom had Second World War experience. Earlier historical wisdom held that this initial force was a "slapped together" and improperly trained brigade group of "Errol Flynn" adventurers who could never live up to the capability of the Canadian regular. But as Johnston shows—just the opposite was the case.

Over the three years, there were essentially three iterations of the brigade group rotated through the Korean theatre. The first sent in 1950 were the "Specials" under the command of Brigadier J. M. "Rocky" Rockingham, himself a citizen volunteer who had already earned a formidable reputation as one of Canada's best senior combat soldiers in the recent German war. And it was he who deliberately picked from among the large numbers of citizen-veterans applying, battalion commanders and many of his other officers because of their previous battle experience and their willingness to fight. Then, in early 1952, the second rotation was the "professionals" of the peacetime Canadian Army commanded by Brigadier Mortimer Patrick Bogert. All his battalion commanders were also from that regular force. The third group were made up of both volunteers and regular personnel raised originally as reinforcements in the newly created third battalions of the existing Canadian Army's three permanent regiments. They were commanded by Brigadier Jean V. Allard, another regular, but one who had been a very competent combat senior officer of World War II.

Johnston shows conclusively that when criticism from allies emerged in 1952-53 about the lackluster fighting performance of the Canadians, it was largely the problem of the regular force. By late 1951, the conflict had settled into a defensive war—a "war of patrols." When he arrived, Bogert and his battalions' officers were too concerned with spit and polish; senior officers lacked professional knowledge; they did not have contact with their front-line troops; nor did they understand the importance of aggressive defence. Consequently there was a breakdown of the highly successful deep patrolling methods practiced so effectively by Rockingham's 'Special Force." With no patrols for raiding, reconnaisance, intelligence, morale, and the variety of other important reasons of good soldiering, the Canadians subsequently lost control of "no-man's land." The enemy had the initiative. Casualties rose. Fortunately, gunners, tankers, and mortarmen—Canadians and others—seemed to have obviated the obvious with deadly firepower and saved the situation. When Allard came in the spring of 1953, he immediately saw what was wrong and he quickly rectified it by intensive training, good officer leadership, and aggressive patrolling. Unfortunately, in the later official historical accounts...