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The Journal of Military History 67.4 (2003) 1336-1337



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Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949. Edited by Mark A. Ryan et al. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2003. ISBN 0-7656-1088-4. Maps. Notes. Tables. Bibliography. Glossary and index. Pp. 336. $26.95. [End Page 1336]

The eleven papers in this book deal with the contemporary history of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and are examples of the growing interest of researchers in Chinese military modernization. However, they also exemplify the problem of writing contemporary history: lack of free access to government archives. Unlike other examples of the genre, however, the book is united thematically and all the papers are of high quality. The subjects include the final campaigns against the Nationalists, wars with the United States in Korea, and with India, as well as the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Vietnamese border clashes. There are also chapters about the PLA's naval and air arms and a chapter on contemporary Chinese doctrinal evolution.

Although they deal with varied topics, the authors highlight common themes. All stress the degree of intricate planning and preparation characteristic of the PLA's method of waging war. They present varying interpretations of the tensions between centralization and autonomy that emerge from their studies of Chinese operations in Korea, the Sino-Indian War, and the border clashes with the Soviet Union and Vietnam. Both approaches have worked with varying degrees of success, and, historically, the extent of tight central control depended upon the political importance of the campaign. In the same manner, the direct links between war and politics depended on the conflict. In Korea, the tensions between field commanders and the political leadership were more apparent than they were in the Taiwan Straits crisis and the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Vietnamese border conflicts. The positive or negative influence attributed to political motivations and judgments raises questions about the criteria the Chinese used to define victory or defeat. The PLA's combat tactics and performance in the conflicts with the United States in Korea and with India, in the Taiwan Straits, and with Vietnam show how quickly it learned and applied lessons from actual operations.

The PLA's lag in arms procurement and military technology has led to an obsession with obtaining the best technology available and put a premium on doctrinal and tactical flexibility. Mao's role is underscored by his prominence as a commander-in-chief and a military theoretician. For better or worse, the PLA bears the imprint of his strategic thought, which remains the centerpiece of its traditions. When investigating the role of deterrence, two points of view emerge, those who believe the PLA and Mao have always taken the wrong path and those who believe there have been necessary tactical sacrifices to achieve large-scale deterrence. The various contributors uphold different sides of the issue and readers will decide the answer on the basis of their own predilections.

As this brief discussion of the themes indicates, this book is useful, interesting, and important. While it does not reach any surprising conclusions, it shows the possibilities for research in contemporary Chinese military history and points the way for other scholars to follow. It is by no means the final word, but the first step on a long and interesting journey.



Lewis Bernstein
Madison, Alabama

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