To the Bitter End: Paraguay and the War of the Triple Alliance (review)

Chris Leuchars presents a straightforward, clearly written account of the Paraguayan War (1864-70), also known as the War of the Triple Alliance. He pays particular attention to President Francisco Solano López of Paraguay, to whom he rightly ascribes much of the responsibility for the conflict. In 1864 that leader rashly launched an attack upon Brazil to forestall what he perceived as his powerful neighbor's growing hegemony in the affairs of the Río de la Plata. Encouraged by an early success in Paraguay's invasion of the Mato Grosso, López overreached himself with a disastrous campaign against Brazil in the lower Plata, and then also blundered into conflict with Argentina and Uruguay. By mid-1865 a riverine blockade by the Brazilian Navy severed Paraguay's access to the outside world, denying any import of war material. The allied armies were on southern Paraguayan soil by 1866, preliminary to the great siege of the fortress of Humaitá, and López faced a war of human and material attrition he could not win.

As the war dragged on, it was increasingly apparent that not only did Paraguay not stand a chance of victory—or even stalemate—but that the allies, particularly, the Brazilians, were adamantly determined not only to destroy López, but to crush Paraguay completely. The author questions those decisions, wondering why no meaningful steps were taken to find a solution to end the conflict. In that regard, he does not adequately consider the outrage felt by Dom Pedro II, Emperor of Brazil, that Paraguay would attack his nation. The Emperor was determined—a conviction shared by his army and political elites—that not only should the Río de la Plata be rid of the trouble-maker López, but that the Paraguayan political system that produced such an unrestrained individual be utterly destroyed.

The position of Paraguay in the heart of South America dictated that the main effort of the allied forces would be an advance up the Paraná-Paraguay river system. The superiority of the Brazilian Navy on the rivers facilitated that strategy. First the enemy had to be ejected from Brazilian and Argentine soil in the lower Plata, and then the strong position near the mouth of the Paraguay River, most notably the fortress of Humaitá, had to be seized. Leuchars handles quite well the difficulties faced by the allies in this effort. He is quite strong when discussing the problems of command of a coalition force. The movements of troops, battlefield tactics, and the battles themselves are clearly described, with excellent eyewitness accounts of the soldiers included. Most of the important battles have good accompanying maps.

By 1869, after the allies had broken the defenses of the south and forced the Paraguayans into the interior, López's army was a starving band wandering in the northeastern wilderness of the republic. Paraguay was now prostrate before its enemies, and as much as 60 percent of its population had perished. In early 1870 López was finally hunted down by Brazilian forces and killed.

The sources for this study are mainly secondary, but used quite well. A few errors have crept into the narrative but do not detract from the worth of this work. Those with a desire to delve more deeply into the origins of this war and the rise of contending nationalisms that troubled the Río de la Plata in the early 1800s are directed to Thomas Whigham's recent work, The Paraguayan War. I. Causes and Early Conduct (2002). However, for a general survey in English, To the Bitter End is a good introduction to the conflict.