The Gulf War of 1991 Reconsidered (review)

The 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, or "Gulf War I" as it is already being referred to in some circles, was an event rapidly fading into public memory as the Clinton administration rode a wave of economic prosperity, a "peace process" in the Middle East, and scandal at home, through the remainder of the decade. Certainly the organizers of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies 2001 conference, held at Boston University in January 2001, had little inkling of dramatic events in the following months, as their goal was to place the 1991 conflict in perspective and evaluate it as one of the "formative events of the post-Cold War era." They could not have anticipated the attack on the World Trade Center in September, war in Afghanistan, an economic depression and increased violence in Palestine. Now the world watches as "Gulf War II" plays itself out.

Edited by Andrew J. Bacevich and Efraim Inbar, this collection of eight papers presented at the Boston conference considers the 1991 conflict from three points of view: Arab, Israeli, and American. From the beginning, I had some problems with the relationship of the book's title to its contents. It is actually an Israeli-American reconsideration of the conflict as only two of the essays, presented by an Israeli defense advisor and an American professor, concern the Arab states. While both are well written and insightful, this outsider's view of the complexity of the Islamic world's response to the war leaves me unconvinced that this group has been covered adequately. While the two essays on Israel are also of interest, they did not lead me to any change in perspective.

However, this organization issue is a quibble as all the articles are solid and thought provoking. Three essays especially stand out. Michael Klare's discussion of arms sales to Iraq during its previous war with Iran is a good analysis of America's contribution to Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait. Thomas G. Mahnken's essay on war termination is a textbook explanation on how we did not, and could have, ended that war properly and prevented the next. Finally, Andrew Bacevich takes a hard look at America's reaction to its "victory," years after all the parades and homecomings had passed. He argues that it fundamentally transformed how the United States regards the nature of armed conflict. First, a reliance on technology, with few friendly casualties, that makes war less costly. This "technological utopianism," Bacevich further argues, now makes war more likely and tempts politicians to intervene around the world. Ultimately, this increased American intervention places military officers in the public eye, transporting them from the military into the political sphere. One only has to watch the avalanche of retired officers commenting on Gulf War II to suspect that there is a profound change in civil-military relations underway. This is a solid book that should be consulted by those interested in the previous, and current, Gulf War.