European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War (review)

Neutrality in World War II was far more difficult than before. The Axis respected no international law and neutrality in the face of Hitlerism raised unique moral issues. Neville Wylie and fourten other scholars from nine countries examine the issues, narratives, and historiography surrounding the neutrality of fourteen mostly smaller European countries. Overall, they have succeeded admirably.

The "phony war neutrals" were overrun in 1940. Denmark (Hans Kirchhoff) pursued appeasement even during the occupation. It was militarily weak and could not expect assistance. Despite criticism of its rapid capitulation, Denmark retained its neutral perspective even during the Cold War. Norway (Patrick Salmon) expected British assistance but feared allied intervention during the Russo-Finnish War. Norway also abandoned neutrality reluctantly, preferring isolation. The Netherlands was more strictly neutral than either Scandinavian country. Bob Moore defends prewar Dutch governments and believes that the importance of prewar pacifism has been overrated. Belgium (Alain Colignon) alone had a military alliance (with France) but returned to neutrality in 1936. Many Flemings hated France, and Leopold III was determinedly pro-neutrality.

The "wait and see" neutrals abandoned neutrality in 1941. Brian Sullivan concurs with Churchill that Italy's misfortunes came from "one man, and one man only," primarily because Mussolini misunderstood Italy's weaknesses. Hungary (Tibor Frank) was trapped between its desire to revise the Trianon treaty and to avoid subordination to the Axis. Romania (Maurice Pearton) had its 1919-20 gains to protect and skillfully faced internal fascism, border disputes, Soviet hostility, and growing dependence on Germany as France weakened. Vesselin Dimitrov pictures Bulgaria's King Boris as a capable figure and notes that Bulgaria alone retained Nazi-era gains. Hitler's suspicions left Yugoslavia (Dragoljub R. Zivojinovic) few choices. Their treaty alienated the (then) pro-western Serbs and led the army to depose Prince Paul—with disastrous results.

Five "long-haul" neutrals avoided war altogether. Elena Hernández-Sandoica and Enrique Moradiellos conclude that Franco was pro-Axis. Spain was weak and Hitler was unwilling to meet Franco's high price for entry into the war, especially as this could cost him the Vichy colonial army. Britain welcomed Portugal's (Fernando Rosas) efforts to keep Spain neutral and rewarded Salazar afterwards. Ireland (Eunan O'Halpin) cut military ties with Britain in 1938 and remained neutral despite (especially American) criticism. Sweden (Paul A. Levine) still debates whether it conceded too much, although it also furnished help to Jews. Wylie concludes that the military contribution to Switzerland's neutrality may be exaggerated and that its neutrality was less distinguished than once thought.

There are very few factual errors. More parallelism would have improved the volume, as would have more attention to the neutrals' militaries and to, in some cases, their remarkable myopia vis-à-vis Hitler. This is an important and well-prepared volume on a topic of great historical and contemporary relevance.