Japanese-Russian Relations, 1907–2007 (review)

The long-awaited official visit to Japan by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on May 11–13, 2009, did not result in any breakthrough in the longstalemated diplomatic impasse between Japan and Russia. These neighboring countries have yet to conclude a peace treaty despite the elapse of more than 64 years since the end of World War II. This abnormal situation is regarded as one of the mysteries in post-World War II international affairs. The reason for such an abnormal situation is simple and obvious: the Northern Territories (as referred to by the Japanese, or the Southern Kuriles as referred to by the Russians) constitute a source of unresolved conflict between Japan and Russia. Tokyo has regarded these islands—the Habomai group of islets and the islands of Shikotan, Kunashir/i, and Etorofu/Iturup off the northern coast of Hokkaido—as Japan's inherent territory which had never previously been claimed by tsarist Russia or the Soviet Union, whereas Moscow has considered them Russian territory seized as a precious spoil of World War II.

I am greatly pleased to see that an excellent masterpiece on this interesting subject has been written by a young American scholar who is fluent in both Japanese and Russian languages and is thoroughly familiar with the given topic. One of the characteristics, and hence great contributions, of Ferguson's volume lies in the fact that it presents a theory regarding the greatly complicated history of Japanese-Russian relations. Ferguson has found a continuing pattern that has repeated itself in bilateral relations: with changes in the international situation, hopes and expectations for normalization of Japanese-Russian relations that might resolve the territorial disputes between these countries emerge; each time, however, domestic obstacles in Russia and/or Japan have prevented these two countries from achieving complete normalization with conclusion of a peace treaty. Ferguson skillfully and convincingly shows that there has been such a cycle of history in Japanese-Russian relations.

In an attempt to answer the question of why this historical pattern has repeated itself, Ferguson tries to distinguish three major determinants of Russo-Japanese relations: international, domestic, and ideational factors. International factors, such as the sudden rapprochement between the United States and China, which took place in the early 1970s, and the end of the cold war in 1989–91, prompted top political leaders in Russia and Japan to rethink their relations and take a more conciliatory approach. On the other hand, domestic factors in both nations have prevented attempts to normalize bilateral relations from bearing fruit. Ideational factors have also frequently obstructed efforts to achieve normalization. By the ideational element, Ferguson means the mindset, perception, and attitude of the general public toward other nations. In short, positive elements in international affairs are frequently outweighed by the combined negative forces of domestic and ideational elements, thus preventing normalization.

I wholeheartedly agree with Ferguson's argument that a certain pattern is observable in the history of Japanese-Russian relations. In fact, when Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, and Vladimir Putin each came to power, Japanese (myself included) had high hopes that these leaders would do something to make a breakthrough in the long-stalemated bilateral relations. In fact, these leaders, for their part, often showed conciliatory gestures to Japan. There were good reasons for them to do so. First of all, they were tempted to conduct their foreign policies in such a way that they were not totally dependent on the United States. Second, due to economic difficulties in Russia, its leaders considered it pertinent to approach Japan, the world's number two economic superpower. Third, during the early days of their reign, Russian political leaders tended to underestimate the difficult nature of solving territorial disputes with Japan.

However, Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin all left their jobs without achieving the normalization of Russia's relations with Japan. They found themselves preoccupied more than they had previously anticipated with their conduct of foreign relations with the United States, European nations, China, and other countries...