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Reviewed by:
  • Japan's Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions
  • Dennis T. Yasutomo (bio)
Japan's Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions. Edited by David Arase. Routledge, London, 2005. xii, 295 pages. £75.00.

Japan's official development assistance (ODA) emerged almost unnoticed in the 1950s as part of a regional trade and wartime reparations policy. In the 1980s, it served as the nation's principal international contribution, and in the 1990s, Japan surpassed Western donors and reigned for a decade as the world's largest donor nation. Japan's "aid diplomacy" countered the global "aid fatigue" among other donors, but since 2001, these donors, led surprisingly by the United States, have steadily increased their aid allocations, while Japan did an about-face. In other words, at the height of its reign, the premier global aid donor slashed its ODA budget and, according to many observers, seriously weakened its major diplomatic weapon, a process expected to continue at least into 2011.

Japan's Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions does not explain this shift. Rather, it focuses on the consequences of budget cuts for aid quality and effectiveness. The study is an edited volume featuring a large cast of characters. Several are recognized Japanese ODA experts who have written or edited their own works and provide comparative chapters centering on their countries or regions: Alan Rix (Australia), Marie Söderberg (Sweden), Michelene Beaudry-Somcynsky (Canada), Sandra Tarte (Pacific Islands), Haider A. Kahn (South and Southeast Asia), and David Arase (United States), the editor of this volume. Other contributors are aid practitioners or regional or country experts knowledgeable about Japanese development policy: Tahir Andrabi (Pakistan), Sang-Tae Kim (South Korea), David Seddon (Britain and South Korea), Anuman Leelasorn (Thailand), Kevin Morrison (World Bank), Shaokui Feng (China), and Kay Warren (Latin America). The line up is international and impressive, although the absence of Japanese aid experts and practitioners is puzzling.

The volume ranges far beyond the question of quality and effectiveness amid budget cuts and lacks a clearly articulated set of criteria or methodology to determine quality and effectiveness. In general, the study seems to evaluate quality and effectiveness on the basis of Japan's aid philosophy, the standards established by the international donor nation consortium (the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), policymaking capability, and on-the-ground implementation. As such, the overall impression is that aid philosophy is coming along, aid quality is improving incrementally, the policymaking [End Page 299] process is semiefficient, and implementation is problematic but appreciated by recipient governments.

Individual chapters are all rewarding reads, and a major strength of the book is the presentation of a variety of case studies of aid policymaking and implementation on the ground. Ultimately, however, this book may present a confusing picture of Japan's overall aid policy without a substantial understanding of development issues or Japanese ODA policymaking institutions and implementation processes. The main problem is that Japan's ODA policy has outrun the ability of analysts and publishers to keep up with the significant ongoing changes. In essence, this book provides primarily a pre-Koizumi cabinet view of ODA policy. Many contributors note ongoing changes as they drafted their chapters—and all state that these changes are "on the right track"—but only Arase attempts to incorporate some of these developments. Therefore, the book is stronger on "old continuities" than "new directions."

Most troublesome throughout the chapters is the depiction of ODA policymaking. Some chapters appear to present slightly different policy landscapes, depending on time period and case study. All contributors agree that the bureaucracy makes ODA policy, but the devil is in the details. Some cases refer to the "four ministry-agency" policy process dominated by the Foreign, Finance, and International Trade and Industry Ministries plus the Economic Planning Agency (EPA). MITI is now METI (Ministry of Economics, Trade, and Industry); the EPA has disappeared; and the "four ministry-agency" process no longer functions. Some note a recent reform that placed more control in the hands of the Foreign Ministry, but most refer to the decentralized policy structure that involves 17, 18, or 12 ministries, depending...

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