Japan and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1950-1964: In the Shadow of the Monolith (review)

W. W. Braddick's book examines the impact of not only the Sino-Soviet alliance but also the subsequent Sino-Soviet split on Japan's diplomacy, economic relations with China and the Soviet Union, two left-wing parties, and intellectuals and public debate. In addition to introductory and concluding chapters, the author devotes two chapters to each topic chronologically, with 1960 as the dividing line for diplomacy and economics and 1962 as the break for the left-wing party and intellectuals.

The book is mainly concerned with the story of Japan. Its relations with four other major countries—the United States, China, the Soviet Union, and Taiwan—are covered only to the extent that they elucidate Japan's reaction to the Sino-Soviet alliance and dispute. Thus, the development of Sino-Soviet relations as well as the development of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance are outside the scope of this study, although a brief background of these two issues would have helped the main story in a larger context. The story has a definite tilt toward the Chinese side, and Japan's policy toward the Soviet Union is slighted to a secondary role. With the exception of a few minor references, Taiwan is largely ignored.

Braddick makes the greatest contribution in his chapters on diplomacy. Examing hitherto unused archival sources in the United States, Japan, Britain, and Australia, he reveals that the relationship between Japan and the United States was marked by constant disagreements over policy toward China. Furthermore, he examines the internal division within the Japanese government, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Despite the Sino-Soviet alliance, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru believed that communist China would be nationalistic and would never become a slave to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, China would be an essential market for Japan's economy. Japan's policy should therefore be to restore relations with communist China, stimulate economic relations with China, and detach China from its alliance with the Soviet Union. This notion, identified as the Yoshida thesis by Braddick, became the foundation of Japan's policy toward China.

Yoshida's conviction was not shaken by the outbreak of the Korean War, but the Yoshida thesis encountered strenuous objections from the United States. Unable to resist American pressure, Yoshida was forced to conclude a peace treaty with Taiwan, but he continued to avoid a total commitment to Taiwan. Braddick's analysis is excellent as far as he examines the divergent views between Japan and the United States with regard to policy toward China. Nevertheless, he ignores the differences in approach to the Soviet Union, especially with regard to the territorial settlement over the Kuril Islands.

Hatoyama Ichirō, who succeeded Yoshida, did not share Yoshida's culturalist conception of international relations. More anticommunist and nationalistic than Yoshida, he sought peaceful coexistence with both China and the Soviet Union. But Hatoyama's policy was hampered by opposition from two sources: American pressure and internal opposition. While signaling his willingness to negotiate for normalization of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, Hatoyama also wished to implement a "two China policy" by exchanging consuls with China. Although Secretary of State John Foster Dulles accepted Japan's accommodation with the Soviet Union as inevitable, he actively intervened to prevent Sino-Japanese rapprochement. Dulles refused to receive Hatoyama's foreign minister, Shigemitsu Mamoru, in April 1955, sending a note warning that the United States would oppose political relations between Japan and China in any form (p. 26).

Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not united on its China policy. Although the powerful pro-U.S. group opposed Hatoyama's policy as tantamount to recognition of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), the China Desk, headed by Ogawa Heishirō, favored recognition of China. Ogawa attended a secret four-day conference in Bangkok, initiating a working-level meeting of officials in the region to...