China's Techno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition from the Nuclear to the Information Age (review)

This book is a major contribution to the recent history of China and the relationship between military technology and national/international politics. Feigenbaum argues that a form of techno-nationalism drove China's strategic technology policy in both the Mao and post-Mao periods, shaping not only its national security but also its developmental strategies. Feigenbaum is not the first scholar to examine this topic, but his treatment has brought to it a degree of cogency, empirical support, nuance, and historical sophistication that sets it apart from the existing literature.

At the heart of the book is the story of how the strategic-weapons elite—the techno-warriors in the title—first delivered nuclear weapons to China against a turbulent domestic and external environment during the 1960s and 1970s and later tried to influence the nation's high- technology policy during the 1980s and 1990s. Nie Rongzhen (1899-1992), a marshal of the Chinese Liberation Army, was the acknowledged leader of the group. Although not a scientist himself, Nie turned out to be a master organizer of China's strategic program. Trusted by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai at the top of the Chinese party state and respected by scientists and engineers who shared his nationalist vision, Nie, with the support of his associates and allies, made two decisive breakthroughs during the Mao years (1949-1976): First, he set up a flexible and effective organizational structure through the National Defense Science and Technology Commission (NDSTC) to oversee the myriad strategic projects, including nuclear weapons, missiles, submarines, and satellites. Second, he articulated a technonationalist vision that justified the pouring of enormous resources into a few advanced weapons systems. Nie argued that it was the only way for China to become atruly international power. In addition, he promised that spinoffs fromthese high-technology pursuits would enhance the conventional weaponry and industrial strength of the country.

Their successes did not shield the strategic weaponeers from the wrenching reforms in the post-Mao era. Under Deng Xiaoping, thenew national leadership adopted the organizational innovations of the NDSTC but shifted the emphasis from nuclear programs to conventional weaponry and civilian technologies. In response, the strategic scientific community proposed in 1986 a new national initiative to meet the challenges facing China, citing the American Strategic Defense Initiative and the European Eureka projects. Approved by Deng, the so-called 863 Plan (after the month of its birth) resulted in major advances in such areas as biotechnology, automation, information technology, energy, and space with both military and civilian applications.

According to Feigenbaum, the 863 Plan built on the earlier strategic-weapons model both in its adoption of a flexible, peer-review-based organizational structure and in its drive for a technonationalist vision for the new era. He further contends that successful as the 863 Plan has been in advancing Chinese capabilities, its state-driven nature has increasingly limited its effectiveness in advancing Chinese technological progress in general. State techno-nationalism has set obstacles to the working of the market mechanism and clashed with the country's increasing integration into the global economy. Feigenbaum sees this contradiction as retarding Chinese modernization. He advocates that China "break with the past" by embracing both entrepreneurialism and globalization, now that "the threats of yesterday have slipped into history" (229).

China's Techno-Warriors is well written and based on an impressive number of published Chinese primary and secondary sources, as well as interviews that Feigenbaum conducted in China and elsewhere from 1993 to 2001. Regrettably, the interviews are cited only anonymously, perhaps to protect the interviewees, and few Chinese archival sources are cited, because they are generally not yet open for research. Not everyone will agree with Feigenbaum's analysis. Chinese defense analysts will probably dispute his assertion that China...