South Asia Faces the Future: Democracy on Hold in Pakistan

In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the subsequent changes in regional and global geopolitical alignments, what are the prospects for a return to civilian rule and open democratic politics in Pakistan? How serious a threat do local Islamic fundamentalist groups pose to Pakistan's political stability? What is the course that a future democratic process could take to return Pakistan to elective rule?

Marking Pakistan's fifty-fourth Independence Day on 14 August 2001, army chief of staff and self-appointed president Pervez Musharraf unrolled a figurative "roadmap to democracy" that called for his military government to oversee elections for the national and provincial assemblies and the Senate in October 2002. Musharraf proudly told his audience--a gathering of mayors elected under the military's local-government plan--that "today I have fulfilled one of my major promises: to hold elections within the time frame given by the Supreme Court." In May 2000, the Court had upheld Musharraf's coup as legitimate under "the doctrine of state necessity," provided that elections were held within three years of the takeover.

Soon after, the September 11 attacks put Pakistan squarely on the front line of the U.S.-led war on terror in Afghanistan. General Musharraf quickly allied himself closely with the antiterrorist coalition that the United States was building, thereby securing international acceptance for his bloodless October 1999 putsch against the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Much to Musharraf's delight, even token international pressure for a return to civilian rule rapidly faded. Democratic leaders from the United States and Europe descended on Islamabad to pay him homage for siding with the civilized world against Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. Indeed, this newfound international recognition has bolstered Musharraf's position as Pakistan's legitimate ruler, with a chance to shape the country's political future on his own terms.

But Islamabad's sudden change of policies carries grave risks. By siding with the U.S.-led coalition, the Musharraf regime has irked pro-Taliban religious hard-liners in Pakistan, who may count on the support of perhaps as much as a tenth of Pakistan's 145 million people. The anger of these well-organized militants poses a potent threat to the regime's hold on power and the political stability of Pakistan. Moreover, the militant Islamic groups that sustain Islamabad's proxy war in Kashmir are also coming under attack from the United States, which has moved to freeze their funds and put them on the U.S. State Department's official list of "foreign terrorist organizations."

Musharraf and his advisors are optimistic that their government, facing a possible radical backlash at home and financial losses due to the war on its borders, will receive substantial economic benefits in return for supporting the U.S.-led coalition. The full extent of the bailout that the Bush administration is offering is not yet clear, but the initial signs are positive. More IMF loans worth $2 billion are coming, a $1 billion U.S. aid package has been announced, and massive humanitarian aid is on its way. Washington has removed sanctions that were imposed because of Pakistan's decision to build and test atomic weapons; trade-quota restrictions are being waived as well. Also lifted have been the so-called democracy sanctions that were put in place under Section 508 of the U.S. Foreign Operations Appropriations Act after the military coup. This law bars Washington from providing military or economic assistance to unelected governments.

Khaki Politics, Mad Mullahs

In Pakistan, each military intervention has created its own set of political distortions. As Leo Rose and D. Hugh Evans wrote in these pages in 1997:

The army's wide political influence distorts the democratic process. . . . Earlier periods of military intervention created new political divisions. Groups that found themselves benefited by authoritarian rule were opposed by others, often linked to the mainstream...