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  • Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960-1968
  • David Easter
Bradley R. Simpson , Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960-1968. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008. 367 pp.

In the early and mid-1960s Indonesia caused great concern to U.S. policymakers. The Indonesian president, Sukarno, was a radical anti-imperialist who aggressively challenged the vestiges of European colonialism in Southeast Asia, first by demanding that the Netherlands cede to him the territory of West Irian and then by embarking on a diplomatic-military offensive called Konfrontasi (Confrontation) against Britain and Malaysia. To support these campaigns, Sukarno established close ties with U.S. enemies the USSR and the People's Republic of China. The domestic situation in Indonesia was equally alarming to the United States because the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), steadily increased its power and influence under the patronage of Sukarno.

Only after a series of confused and bloody events in Indonesia from 1965 to 1967 was the Communist threat eliminated to Washington's satisfaction. In 1965 a coup was mounted in Jakarta by an obscure group that became known as the 30th of September Movement. The coup was swiftly suppressed by the army but not before the plotters had killed six leading Indonesian generals. The Indonesian army accused the PKI of masterminding the 30th September Movement and retaliated with a ferocious campaign of repression against the party. An estimated 300,000-500,000 people were killed, and the PKI was eliminated as a political force. The army leadership, headed by Suharto, then dislodged Sukarno and established a military dictatorship. Suharto's government abandoned Konfrontasi, distanced itself from Moscow and Beijing, and established a friendly relationship with the United States.

For many years this violent, turbulent period in Indonesia was neglected in histories of the Cold War in Asia, overshadowed as it was by the U.S. war in Vietnam. Since the late 1990s, however, the release of U.S., Australian, and British documents has encouraged fresh interest in Indonesia's part in the Cold War. Several books have examinedWestern policy toward Sukarno's Indonesia, including John Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno: British, American, Australian and New Zealand Diplomacy in the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation, 1961-65 (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan Press, 2000); Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961-1965: [End Page 157] Britain, United State, Indonesia and the Creation of Malaysia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); and David Easter, Britain and the Confrontation with Indonesia, 1960-66 (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2004). John Roosa has also produced a detailed study of the 1965 coup attempt in Indonesia (John Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto's Coup d'Etat in Indonesia [Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006]). Onto this field Bradley Simpson brings his new book, Economists with Guns.

The main focus of Simpson's book is U.S. policy toward Indonesia from the late 1950s to 1968. U.S. policy alternated between trying to establish a modus vivendi with Sukarno and trying to weaken or remove him. The United States initially supported democracy in Indonesia but then secretly backed regional rebellions in 1957-1958. Under John F. Kennedy, the United States helped Sukarno to recover West Irian from the Dutch and offered extensive economic aid. Under Lyndon Johnson, the United States opposed Konfrontasi, froze aid, and supported Sukarno's removal from power by the army. Simpson reveals that behind these apparently incoherent switches in policy the United States had consistent aims and generally favored the Indonesian military. He argues that the U.S. government sought to counter Soviet and Chinese influence, combat the rise of the PKI, and promote capitalist economic development. To achieve these goals, the United States cultivated the Indonesian army as an anti-Communist force in Indonesia and used covert means to strengthen it against the PKI. These clandestine efforts culminated in the military's seizure of power in 1966-1967. Simpson is unable to add much to Roosa's account of the origins and causes of the 30th of September Movement, but he does provide fresh information on how the United States aided the Indonesian army in...

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