Religious Zionism and the Framing of a Constitution for Israel

Introduction

ALMOST FIFTY YEARS AFTER ITS foundation, the State of Israel still lacks a formal constitution—a situation that is sometimes explained by the opposition from the religious circles to any constitutional arrangement. In the view of some, these circles still have enormous influence on the Israeli political system, but in terms of power relations, this is almost impossible. Religious political parties are far from accumulating such influence. When their political strength is measured by number of seats in the Knesset, the average of all fourteen national elections (from 1949 to 1996) stands at only fourteen percent. Their peak participation—nineteen percent—was achieved in 1996, while the low ebb—eleven percent—was in 1984. This data includes both flanks of the religious camp—the national-Zionists, represented by the NRP (National Religious Party), and the ultra-orthodox non-Zionists, represented by Agudat Yisrael. It seems more than strange that a weak minority would be attributed with so much influence on the political system.

The most crucial period for the framing of a constitution for Israel was a few years after statehood. At that time, the governing party—Mapai—was dominant and secure, and it held veto power on any potential governing coalition. In this situation, the real power of the religious political parties was even smaller than their share in the Knesset. Up to 1977, four years after Mapai (changed to "Labor" in 1968) lost its dominance, the religious political parties were not a necessary component in governing coalition, but Mapai tended to cooperate in the governing coalition with some or all the religious political parties. The largest of these, the NRP (founded in 1956 by a merger of the two national-Zionist parties of HaMizrachi and HaPoel-HaMizrachi), took part in almost all the governing coalitions from 1949 to 1977 except for short periods in 1958-1959 and 1974. Since Labor lost its dominance in 1973, the influence of the NRP increased, although it was not a necessary partner in the governing coalition. The two ultra-orthodox non-Zionist political parties, Agudat Yisrael and Poalei Agudat Yisrael, participated in the governing coalitions from statehood until 1952. Poalei Agudat Yisrael joined the governing coalitions also from 1960 to 1969.

Since 1977, the religious political parties have become necessary partners of any governing coalition (except a grand coalition in which both large political parties form a national unity government). Their growing political influence has inhibited any serious attempt to complete a liberal constitution. The veto power argument for the period before 1977 is thus misleading.

The four main arguments of this essay are:

1. The religious political parties did not oppose the idea of framing a constitution for Israel during the initial stage of Israeli statehood. Their opposition evolved over the years. This was because, in the early years after independence, framing a constitution did not mean acceptance of liberal positions. In the course of time, however, the substance of a possible constitution has changed into a typical liberal constitution, something the religious political parties stood against a liberal constitution.
2. The bargaining power of the religious political parties has drastically increased since 1977. This development explains their success in preventing a constitution. Even during the six years of the National Unity Government (1984-1990) a constitution was not framed. On the other hand, the religious political parties have not been able to use their bargaining power to its full extent, since their growing identification with the positions and policies of the right-wing Likud in a wide spectrum of issues has decreased their options for maneuvering.
3. Avoiding a constitution during the initial stages of statehood cannot be directly attributable to opposition from the religious political parties, but was mainly the result of the opposition of Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and the majority of his party (Mapai). Although the Labor Party (which was Mapai prior to 1968) no longer opposes a constitution, the increase in the bargaining power of...