Kennedy, Ben-Gurion and the Dimona Project 1962-1963

Introduction

DURING THE COURSE OF 1962-1963, a significant shift took place in the attitude of the Western powers, particularly the United States, toward Israel's nuclear development. Until then, American policy was characterized by moderation and a low profile. ¹ Change began several months after Ben-Gurion's visit to the United States and his meeting with President Kennedy in May, 1961. Thereafter, the American government exerted increasingly intense and unrelenting pressure to allow ongoing supervision of the nuclear reactor in Dimona. This change in American policy was precipitated by four developments.

First, President Kennedy focused on Israel's nuclear program only after his prestige and popularity had been secured. The discovery of Israel's nuclear activity during December 1960 and January 1961 took place during a "twilight hour" in American foreign policy, when the Eisenhower administration was concluding its term of office and Kennedy administration was organizing to take control. His new administration was unprepared to attend to such a sensitive and complex issue, despite the fact that nuclear non-proliferation had been presented as one of supreme importance during his election campaign. After the Kennedy administration had gained experience and prestige in the international arena, particularly its impressive success in handling the Cuban missile crisis (October 1962), it turned to deal intensively with Israel's nuclear activity.

Second, David Ben-Gurion's personal status eroded even as Kennedy's was enhanced. Both the "Lavon Affair" and the handling of the controversy over German scientists involved with Egyptian weapons development diminished Ben-Gurion's ability to govern and the level of his authority. An indication of this decline in power and authority was that the struggle for succession began in earnest. ² Ben-Gurion's apparent decline led the American government to expect that it could force Israel to be more susceptible to pressure.

Third, the strength of the ties between Israel and France in defense matters diminished following the rise of the De Gaulle regime and the granting of independence to Algeria. ³ This, in turn, resulted in an increase in Israel's dependence upon the United States, thereby providing the Kennedy administration with the expectation of greater leverage over Israel. ⁴

Fourth, Ben-Gurion was concerned about an unfavorable shift of power in the region as a result of movements toward unification among Arab states, ⁵ as well as the armament programs of Egypt and Syria. ⁶ These led him to explore the possibility of obtaining guarantees from the American and even Soviet governments. ⁷ There seems no doubt that these attempts led the Kennedy administration to conclude that, in exchange for some sort of "guarantees" to Israel, it would be possible to demand that Israel significantly restrict, and possibly even shut down, its nuclear project in Dimona. At a minimum, it was expected that Israel would agree to accept ongoing American supervision.

Finally, by 1962-1963 the Kennedy administration felt an urgency about Israel's nuclear development. ⁸ The United States became convinced that it needed to impose its will on Israel before the Israeli nuclear program at Dimona produced irreversible results.

The Western Perception of Israel's Nuclear Program, 1962-63

Throughout 1962-63, Great Britain made intensive efforts to coordinate evaluations of Israel's nuclear activities and to formulate an appropriate policy. Doubts were raised in the British government regarding the possible superficiality of an initial inspection of the Dimona reactor by two American scientists. However, British officials hesitated to bring this to the attention of the American administration, apparently because of the possibility that the Americans would be offended by the charge. ⁹ Moreover, the British doubted whether a second inspection would be any more thorough, or that another American inspection would not allay Arab suspicions. The British held that only a neutral country could satisfactorily conduct an inspection of the Dimona reactor, and Canada was thought to be the most appropriate country to fulfill this role. ¹⁰ Consequently, during the early...