In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

International Security 27.1 (2002) 107-148



[Access article in PDF]

A Farewell to Germs
The U.S. Renunciation of Biological and Toxin Warfare 1969-70

Jonathan B. Tucker


In autumn 2001, letters containing powdered anthrax spores were sent through the U.S. mail, killing five people, infecting several others, temporarily disrupting the operation of all three branches of the federal government, and frightening millions of Americans. These unprecedented attacks transformed the largely hypothetical threat of biological terrorism into a harsh reality and increased public interest and concern about U.S. government efforts to address the problem. Because current U.S. policies on biological weapons date back to the Nixon administration, understanding the factors that shaped those decisions can illuminate some key issues facing the United States as it confronts the growing threats of biological warfare and terrorism.

On November 25, 1969, President Richard M. Nixon announced that the United States had decided to renounce the possession and use of lethal and incapacitating biological weapons even for retaliation, and would henceforth confine its biological research program to defensive measures. The administration also declared that it would destroy its entire stockpile of biological weapons over the next few years. "These important decisions," President Nixon said, "have been taken as an initiative toward peace. Mankind already carries in its own hands too many of the seeds of its own destruction. By the examples we set today, we hope to contribute to an atmosphere of peace and understanding between nations and among men." 1

The U.S. renunciation of biological weapons, which was expanded in February 1970 to cover toxins (nonliving poisons produced by bacteria and other organisms), was the first time that a major power had unilaterally renounced an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. Despite the importance of this [End Page 107] step, the political and bureaucratic factors that led to it are poorly understood. The most detailed study of the policymaking process involved in President Nixon's decision is a Stanford University doctoral dissertation by Forrest Frank that was written in 1974, shortly after the events occurred. 2 Because the relevant U.S. government documents were classified at the time, Frank's analysis was based on press accounts and interviews with officials and outside observers. The present account draws on a number of National Security Council (NSC) and State Department documents that have since been declassified, making it possible to address some previously unanswered questions. First, what were the internal and external political factors that caused the Nixon administration to address the issue of biological warfare in 1969? Second, why did Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird take a position in the internal policy debate that differed from that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)? Third, what concessions were needed to win the support of the uniformed military?

This article also examines the historical legacy of President Nixon's decision. The U.S. renunciation of biological and toxin warfare had a positive effect on the international political climate and opened the way for the rapid negotiation of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), a multilateral treaty banning the development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of such weapons. At the same time, the decision had a number of negative consequences. First, the fact that the United States had unilaterally renounced biological warfare (BW) reduced the incentive of U.S. negotiators to incorporate into the BWC an effective mechanism for monitoring compliance, especially given the Soviet Union's aversion to on-site inspections. Yet without formal verification measures, the BWC was reduced to little more than a "gentleman's agreement," which the Soviet Union and then Russia violated on a large scale until at least 1992. Second, because President Nixon's decision authorized a biological defense research program but did not provide for effective oversight by either the White House or the Congress, the U.S. Army and the intelligence community were given free rein to pursue certain questionable biodefense projects that have skirted, if not violated, prohibitions in the BWC.

This article recounts the history of the...

pdf

Share