Editors' Note

International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 3–4© 2000 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 3 Editors’Note Does strategy exist? The skeptics say no: The realities of war—its boundless complexities and uncertainties— make effective strategy impossible. Others who respond positively nonetheless disagree on strategy’s central features and its ability to inºuence the outcome of war. Deªning strategy as “a plan for using military means to achieve political ends,” Richard Betts of Columbia University examines ten critiques of the practicability of strategy and responds to each. Betts concludes that the prospects for successfully implementing a particular strategy are weak at best. With this qualiªcation in mind, Betts then outlines several scenarios in which strategy can work. Growing tensions between Taipei and Beijing have led many to call for a more formal U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan. Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution contends that even without direct U.S. military involvement, China cannot conquer Taiwan, a situation that is likely to hold for at least the next decade. Accordingly , O’Hanlon counsels U.S. policymakers against formally committing the United States to the defense of Taiwan, arguing that ofªcials in Taipei could misread such a step as U.S. encouragement of Taiwan’s drive for independence—the result of which could be a major confrontation between the United States and China. Robert Ross of Boston College analyzes the consequences of the Clinton administration ’s May 1995 decision to approve a visa for Taiwan’s leader, Lee Teng-hui, to visit the United States. That decision, according to Ross, represented the latest in a series of actions taken by U.S. ofªcials that seemed to signal a shift in U.S. policy toward Taiwan . Ross traces the events culminating in the March 1996 Taiwan Strait confrontation , in which the United States demonstrated its commitment to defend Taiwan against mainland China by deploying two carrier battle groups to the strait. That incident , Ross argues, demonstrates how easy it is for the United States to be drawn into a debate over an issue of peripheral U.S. concern: Taiwan’s legal status. Ross ends on a cautionary note: “Washington cannot permit American ideological support for Taiwan ’s democracy . . . to undermine the politics of war and peace between the United States and China.” Realists offer various reasons why states are driven by self-interest and a desire to dominate others. Classical realists grounded their explanations in theology or metaphysics . Neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz argue that the anarchic nature of the international system compels states to engage in self-help behavior. Bradley Thayer of the University of Minnesota at Duluth offers another alternative. He posits that egoism and domination, two “critical components of any realist argument in explaining inter- International Security 25:2 4 national politics,” are the products of evolution. In grounding realism in evolutionary theory, Thayer maintains that he is according realism the scientiªc legitimacy it has lacked thus far. Does the United States have an industrial policy? Some say that the U.S. laissezfaire approach works against the development of any meaningful industrial policy. Glenn Fong of the American Graduate School of International Management disagrees. Based on an examination of nine case studies, Fong concludes that the federal government has not only improved its capability to develop and execute technology and industrial policy measures, but has done so for the speciªc purpose of enhancing U.S. economic competitiveness. Dale Copeland of the University of Virginia reviews Alexander Wendt’s book, Social Theory of International Politics. Copeland criticizes Wendt’s central claim— that states’ discursive social practices create a shared culture that determines whether the international system is conºictual or peaceful—for its failure to consider a critical aspect of the realist worldview: the inºuence of uncertainty on state behavior. note to contributors International Security welcomes submissions on all aspects of security affairs. Manuscripts should be typed, double-spaced, with notes double-spaced at the end. All artwork must be camera-ready. A length of 5,000–10,000 words is appropriate. To facilitate review, authors should send...