Spirals, Security and Stability in East Asia

Correspondence Jennifer M. Lind Spirals, Security, and Stability in East Asia Thomas J. Christensen To the Editors: In his article “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,”1 Thomas Christensen argues that East Asia is primed for conºict. He contends that security dilemma theory, and two other exacerbating factors, predict spirals of tension between China and Japan. First, Chinese historical memories of Japanese aggression make China especially fearful of increases in Japanese military activities. Second, because China regards Taiwan as a renegade province rather than an independent country, the acquisition of even defensive weapons by Taiwan or Japan (a potential Taiwanese ally) threatens China and may provoke spirals. Based on these arguments, Christensen concludes that the United States should limit the Japanese role in the U.S.-Japan alliance. For example, the United States should not codevelop theater missile defense (TMD) with Japan because this could trigger spirals between Japan and China (p. 75). In this letter I argue that Christensen greatly overstates the potential for conºict in the region. First, I argue that he misapplies security dilemma theory to East Asia. Security dilemma theory actually predicts stability in the region, not dangerous spirals. Second, I show that Christensen’s application of security dilemma theory is falsiªed by evidence from the past ªfty years. This evidence conªrms my argument that spirals are unlikely in East Asia, despite historical grievances and the issue of Taiwanese sovereignty . The implication of my analysis is that U.S. alliance policies in East Asia need not be hamstrung by fears that the region is primed for conºict. Japan can and should be a full and active member of the alliance that guarantees its security. security dilemma theory and the risk of spirals in east asia Christensen argues that security dilemma theory predicts that East Asia is prone to spirals of tension (p. 49). The theory posits that an increase in military capability International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 190–200 190 Jennifer M. Lind is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science and the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The author wishes to thank Thomas Christensen, Eugene Gholz, Daryl Press, and Stephen Van Evera for valuable comments on previous drafts. Thomas J. Christensen is Associate Professor of Political Science and a member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 1. Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 49–80. Further references to this article appear in parentheses in the text. inherently increases both a country’s defensive and offensive capabilities.2 Therefore a state seeking only to boost its own security may threaten its neighbors. Christensen argues that heavy dependence on sea trade in East Asia will encourage states in the region to build power projection forces to protect their economic interests in the sea-lanes. These power projection forces will threaten other East Asian countries, triggering spirals and possibly wars (p. 50). Christensen is wrong: security dilemma theory predicts stability in East Asia. The theory only predicts dangerous spirals (those leading to major crises or wars) under conditions in which offensive military operations are easy.3 In East Asia, however, geography and current technology trends make the region highly defense dominant. Water barriers separate Japan, China, and Taiwan (the countries Christensen examines), so an invasion of any of these countries would require an extremely difªcult amphibious assault. Furthermore, offensive operations against shipping in the sea-lanes would not be much easier. Because the region is defense dominant, security dilemma theory does not predict dangerous spirals between Japan, China, and Taiwan.4 Amphibious invasions have always been extremely difªcult offensive operations,5 and they are increasingly so in this age of long-range detection systems and antiship missiles. Because of long-range detection technologies, attackers are unlikely to achieve surprise. Preparing for an amphibious assault would require massing stockpiles of equipment, hundreds of ships, and tens of thousands of men at port facilities near the target. These preparations would be dif...