Editors' Note

Editors’Note In the ªrst of two articles on the 1999 war over Kosovo, Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman of the RAND Corporation seek to dispel the notion that NATO air attacks alone brought Serbia to the negotiating table. They argue instead that air power worked synergistically with other factors—including the threat of a NATO ground assault, declining Russian support for the Serb cause, and the role of the Kosovo Liberation Army—in ending the conºict. More generally, Byman and Waxman maintain that the current debate over the role of air power as an instrument of coercion is “fundamentally ºawed.” Noting that the outcome of this debate could have broad policy implications, the authors suggest that instead of asking if air power alone can coerce an adversary to surrender, political and military leaders, as well as theoreticians, should ask: “How can [air power] contribute to successful coercion, and under what circumstances are its contributions most effective?” Questions continue to swirl around Slobodan Milosevic’s decision to pit Serb troops against NATO forces in the 1999 battle over Kosovo. Given NATO’s overwhelming military superiority, what motivated the Serb leader to reject the Rambouillet accords and to ªght a war that, at least on the surface, Serbia stood no chance of winning? Moreover, why did Milosevic agree to negotiate an end to the war when he did? Barry Posen of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology addresses both questions through the “lens of strategy.” According to Posen, Milosevic most likely had a political-military strategy to deal with NATO: his aim was to divide its members over Kosovo. As long as his strategy held out the possibility of driving a wedge between the coalition members, Milosevic could afford to keep the war going. Once it became clear that the coalition would not split over Kosovo, Milosevic agreed to settle the war on terms more favorable to Serbia than the Rambouillet accords. It was, says Posen, a strategy that “on the whole worked surprisingly well.” How should the United States deal with so-called rogue states that threaten to use chemical or biological weapons against the U.S. homeland or its troops abroad? Scott Sagan of Stanford University examines Washington’s “calculated ambiguity doctrine ,” which holds that the United States does not rule out the use of nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or biological weapons attack. Sagan argues that the risks associated with this doctrine outweigh the beneªts. He warns that although the ambiguity doctrine might decrease the likelihood of a chemical or biological attack, it International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 3–4© 1999 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 3 also raises the probability that Washington would feel compelled to use nuclear weapons to respond to such an attack. Sagan concludes that the United States should renounce the nuclear option and instead recommit itself to meeting a chemical or biological attack with overwhelming conventional force. Neta Crawford of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, challenges the scholarly community to pay greater attention to the role of emotion and emotional relationships in international relations. The inºuence of emotions in world politics, Crawford contends, extends to “the practices of diplomacy, negotiation, and postconºict peacebuilding ” and thus deserves more systematic analysis. In a review of Elizabeth Kier’s book Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars, Douglas Porch takes issue with Kier’s explanation of Germany’s defeat of France and Britain in 1940. He contends that Kier’s claim that the military doctrines of both countries led to their defeat does not stand up to scrutiny. Porch suggests the problem lay not with their military doctrines, but with the failure of France and Britain to execute them effectively. The issue concludes with letters on two articles that appeared in the spring 1999 issue of International Security. First, Rodney Jones counters several points made by Sumit Ganguly in his article “India’s Pathway to Pokhran II.” Ganguly responds. Next, Jennifer Lind comments on Thomas Christensen’s article “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia.” Christensen replies. note to...