Overextension, Vulnerability, and Conflict: The "Goldilocks Problem" in International Strategy (A Review Essay)

Overextension, vulnerability and conflict The "Goldilocks Problem" in International Strategy (A Review Essay) 1 Richard Rosecrance Charles Kupchan, The Vulnevability of Empire Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994 I Nations face the same problem as Goldilocks blundering into the house of the Three Bears.In dealing with problems posed by other states, they can find a response that commits too much, too little, or just the right amount. They may undertake commitments they cannot sustain, or they may commit too little, in terms of both alliances and armaments, to restrain an adversary. In the recent literature on international behavior, most scholars explain how nations get it wrong-that is, by being too aggressive or too cooperative. This is perhaps inevitable, given the focus of international strategic research on the causes of conflict. Britain and France receive particularly low marks because of their appeasement policy in the 1930s; the conventional wisdom faults Britain for being too conciliatory toward Germany. Barry Posen, on the other hand, observes that appeasement or no, Britain shifted the adjustment costs of resisting Germany onto France and built up her home (and particularly fighter) defense, while following balance-of-power policies (which were, however, not altogether successful ones).Posen also claims that France, on its own part, too energetically pursued balance-of-power alliances with Belgium and Holland. Striving to get others to share the costs of resisting Germany, it neglected its home defense. In pursuit of this policy, France rushed in to defend Belgium, opening the way for a German attack through the Ardennes which led to its fall.' In like manner, Zara Steiner and Richard Rosecrance conclude that Britain was too zealous in making and honoring a commitment against Germany. Britain's own grand strategy Richard Rosecrance is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International Relations at the University of California at Los Angeles. ~~ 1. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: Britain, France, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984). lnterrrational Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995),pp. 145-163 01995 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 145 International Security 19:4 1 146 and economic situation should have counseled delay and a short-term continuation of the appeasement policy in 1939.This did not happen, however, because of domestic pressures.2 The problem nations face is a grave and perhaps insoluble one in general terms. A state relies on three resources to cope with foreign threats: (1)its own mobilized military strength; (2) the mobilization base of its economy; and (3) allies.Strictly speaking, all states remain insecure (and therefore vulnerable) in that no one state can defend itself against a combination of all other^.^ Even if all states were equal in strength and allies equitably distributed among them to sustain a balance of power, there would always be the theoretical possibility of ganging up, for alliances do not alwaysfunctionto restrain aggression.Allies move from one protagonist to another. Thus, states have to strive to influence other nations' intentions;they cannot always count on offsetting their capabilities . The Work of Posen, Snyder, and Kupchan Three of the most interesting recent analyses of nations' responses to their international situations have been written by Barry Posen, Jack Snyder, and Charles K~pchan.~ Each makes important contributions to the study of world politics. Posen is less concerned with military behavior (balancing and bandwagoning , for example) than with military d~ctrine.~ Still, the variables he employs could easily be used (and have in fact been used by others) to explain national action. Geography, technology, balance of power, and organization theory help to explain what nations do, not only what militaries plan.6Posen 2. See Richard Rosecrance and Zara Steiner, "BritishGrand Strategy and the Origins of World War 11," in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 124-153. 3. This might be true in the nuclear age as well for, as weapons spread, the "assured destruction" requirements of retaliating on all possible combinations of opponents greatly rise. All states will not retain...